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Abstract
The communication layer leaks important private information even in the presence
of encryption, which makes anonymous communication a fundamental element of
systems that protect the privacy of users. Traffic mixers have long been used to achieve
communication anonymity, but the security challenges and the resulted inefficiencies
hinder the path to a wide adoption of these systems. In this thesis, we take a step
towards improving the security of traffic mixers and building a platform for efficient
anonymous communication.
We begin by revisiting Binomial Mix, which is one of the most effective designs
for traffic mixing proposed to date, and the one that introduced randomness to the
behaviour of traffic mixers. When thoroughly examined in different traffic conditions,
Binomial Mix proved to be significantly more resilient against attacks than previously
believed.
We then build on the design of Binomial Mix and propose two new designs
for traffic mixers. The first design, Multi-Binomial Shared-Pool Mix (MBSP Mix),
employs multiple sources of randomness which results in a behaviour less predictable
by the attacker and thus provides a higher degree of anonymity. The second design,
Multi-Binomial Independent-Pool Mix (MBIP Mix), enables a single traffic mixer to
anonymise multiple communication channels with potentially differing latencies. This
additional property significantly improves the security and efficiency of the mix.
Moving beyond the design of traffic mixers in isolation, we propose the architecture
and details of a generic framework for anonymous communication. The proposed
framework consists of various parts designed to enable the integration of various
Anonymous Communication Systems as plug-in components into a shared and unified
system. In addition to achieving a larger user-base and enjoying its associated
security benefits, this approach enables the reusability of components across multiple
communication systems.
Finally, we also present techniques to make the circuit establishment facility of
the framework resistant towards Denial-of-Service attacks. We believe that our work
is one step towards building a fully developed generic framework for anonymous
communication and our results can inspire and be used for the design of a robust
generic framework.
xi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.
—Justice William O. Douglas
1.1 Motivation
The Internet has now infiltrated more or less every aspect of our lives. The human race
is so heavily dependent on this technology that our methods predating it now seem
excruciating and belong to the Stone Age. In the modern world, the Internet has made
our daily communications so inexpensive and convenient that we no longer consider
distance to be an obstacle in engaging with our peers. Business and retail, in the
presence of the Internet, have been transformed to become significantly more efficient
and globalised. Similarly, technology is changing many other aspects of our everyday
lives. For example, the emergence and widespread use of electronic currencies (e.g.
Bitcoin [1]) is revolutionising financial transactions, and technology companies have
been steadily changing the way we use services (e.g. Uber [2]). Without the Internet,
these significant technological improvements would have been inconceivable.
However, the Internet was not designed to protect the privacy of its users. At the
time of its inception, it was impossible to imagine the impact of this technology and
the omnipresence it has achieved to date. The lack of privacy and its widespread use
have made the Internet a perfect platform to, unfortunately, invade the privacy of
billions of users globally.
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The metadata and unencrypted content of Internet-based applications are exposed
to parties who happen to have access to the physical links of the network. These
include a wide range of different parties, such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
government agencies and infrastructure providers. Such entities may have various
intentions and interests with which an Internet user may or may not be in sympathy.
For example, while a user may support an act of law enforcement, it is highly likely that
they will rebuff many other intentions such as the act of spying, Internet censorship,
or profiling for targeted advertisements.
Access to and possession of important private information, such as the content and
metadata of Internet communications, is a great power which must come with great
responsibility. Nonetheless, conflicting personal and national interests often lead to
the use of personal information in ways that the users, should they ever be informed
about the act, would never have consented to.
It is crucial to note that encryption and steganography can be used to protect only
the content of the communication but not its metadata such as Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses and information about the times and volumes of the communications. The
Internet metadata reveals a great deal of private information about an Internet user.
Anonymous Communication Systems (ACSs) are systems that enable their users
to communicate anonymously, that is, in ways that not only the content but also
the metadata of their communication is protected. ACSs are an important part
of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) and can achieve different degrees of
anonymity according to what is necessary in the circumstances. These systems are
used for a diverse range of applications such as election schemes, Voice over IP
(VoIP), file sharing, publishing and accessing online material, and sending instant
email messages. The reasoning behind the use of ACSs is manifold and includes,
e.g., protection of privacy and personal preferences, circumventing censorship and
surveillance, whistle-blowing and freedom of speech. In Section 2.5.6 we present
further details of the numerous applications of ACSs and enumerate some of the
existing systems built specifically for these applications.
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1.2 Background
In this section we briefly review the concepts and definitions which assist in
understanding the immediately following sections, namely, the problem statement
and research questions considered by this thesis. The topics discussed hereunder will
be revisited in Chapter 2, where we provide more details and also discuss many other
related issues.
1.2.1 Anonymity
We adopt the definition of anonymity proposed by Pfitzmann and Hansen which is
widely used in the anonymity literature. That is, anonymity of a subject means that
the subject is “not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set” [3, 4]. In
other words, from the perspective of the adversary, he “cannot sufficiently identify
the subject” within the anonymity set, which implies both that there is a possibility
to quantify anonymity, and that certain applications may require a definition of a
threshold where the anonymity begins [4].
The anonymity set constitutes the set of subjects with potentially the same
attributes who might cause an action. The anonymity set can differ in accordance
with the knowledge of the adversary, and is therefore relative with respect to the
adversary [4]. It can also vary over time [4].
In a communication system, the sender of a message can enjoy sender anonymity
only within a set of potential senders, namely the sender anonymity set. Likewise,
the receiver of a message can enjoy receiver anonymity only within the receiver
anonymity set. These two sets may be disjoint, be the same or may overlap [3, 4].
Anonymity can be considered both for an individual subject, referred to as
individual anonymity, and for all the users of an ACS, referred to as global anonymity.
Assuming other conditions are equal, the global anonymity of an ACS improves in two
circumstances. Firstly, it improves when the number of members in the anonymity set
grows and, secondly, when there is a more even distribution of senders (in the sender
anonymity set) and receivers (in the receiver anonymity set) in the system [3–7].
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(A) Mix as a Black Box
 (B) Internals of a Mix
Figure 1.1: A mix is the first type of ACS which can be thought to be working as
a black box (part (A)) in order to hide the link between the incoming and outgoing
messages (part (B)).
Evidently, the number of participants in either of the anonymity sets is a function
of the number of users of the ACSs in question. Therefore, assuming the anonymisation
procedure maximises anonymity by creating the largest anonymity sets possible, a
higher degree of anonymity achieved by an ACS is a function of a higher number of
users using that system. In other words, the more users, the more likely it is for the
system to offer a higher degree of global anonymity.
1.2.2 The Original Mix Design (Chaumian Mix)
Research activity to build ACSs commenced with the seminal work of Chaum in
1981 [8] whereby he proposed a special network router known as a mix which could
provide an anonymous email service. A mix is a black box, similar to what is
shown in Figure 1.1(A), which is designed to hide the link between the messages
it receives and those it relays and thereby prevents an adversary from learning that
link. Figure 1.1(B) shows the internals of a mix used by Alice in order to send an
anonymous message to Bob. By mixing the communication of two other channels, the
mix relays the message in a way unknown to and unexpected by the adversary.
The messages that a mix receives are encrypted and usually contain the address of
the next mix that the messages should be sent to. After receiving a message, the mix
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performs a number of actions on the message such as, e.g., encryption, decryption,
appending dummy bits (i.e. padding), randomising, batching and delaying. These
actions are mainly intended to eliminate from the channel the information that an
adversary could otherwise use to discover the link between the incoming and outgoing
messages (e.g. timing and bitwise similarities). Eventually, the mix relays the message
to its final destination or to another mix.
1.2.3 Mix Systems and Mixnets
Since the proposal of the original mix, research in the field of anonymous
communication has been very active and many designs and improvements have been
proposed. Some of these designs are based on the original Chaumian mix, which are
generally referred to as mix systems [9, 10].
Mixes are used in anonymising ISDN telephone systems [11], real-time
communication [12], web surfing [13, 14], email exchange [10, 15–19], and generic
high- and low-latency routing [20–25]. Further details about the existing mix designs
will be presented in Section 2.6.
Mixes are commonly used together in groups to achieve a higher degree of
anonymity and/or to build a more resilient system. A network of connected mixes is
commonly referred to as a mixnet. Over the years many mixnets have been designed
and some of them now have a large user-base, such as Tor [26] and I2P [27, 28]
networks. Further details about the existing mixnets will be presented in Section 2.7.
1.3 Problem Statement
As mentioned in Section 1.2.2, a mix should carry out a number of tasks on the
messages it receives such as decrypting and encrypting messages, extracting routing
information from the messages, unifying the size of messages, delaying them for certain
periods, and executing a selection algorithm to choose a subset of messages to be
relayed. Note that not every mix system is required to carry out all of these tasks,
and that the strategy and actual implementation may vary in each system.
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The above-stated tasks come with an inherent time cost. In other words, more
sophisticated or time-consuming tasks translate into a higher delay imposed by the
mix to the anonymised communication channel. It must be highlighted that some
of these tasks (e.g. the selection algorithm) may have an intentional delay as part of
their process. The resultant delays negatively affect the usability of the ACSs and may
even render them unfit for the applications with low-latency requirements. There has
always been a trade-off between the degree of security that a mix system can achieve
and the corresponding delay imposed on the communication channel. Therefore,
building mix systems that can achieve a good balance of security and efficiency is
important and challenging.
The delay resulting from a strong anonymisation process can make a highly secure
mix unfit for the communications with low-latency requirements. Therefore, there
is a divide between the design of mixes and mixnets that offer anonymity to the
low-latency communications and those that serve the high-latency ones. We discussed
in Section 1.2.1 that a higher number of users in a mix system leads to a higher degree
of global anonymity achieved by that system. An ACS that can anonymise both high-
and low-latency traffic can attract a larger number of users and, therefore, can achieve
a higher degree of global anonymity. Therefore, it is important to create ACSs that
can attract a large number of users.
Furthermore, the development of multiple mixnets in isolation not only divides
the user-base of all these systems, but also does the same to the efforts of the
respective communities in research and development. Implementation and testing
of these systems are conducted in isolation and reusability of code, simulation, test
and deployment does not exist. Therefore, there is room for a unified approach to
anonymisation by mixes that allows multiple systems to operate in a shared platform
in order to benefit from a collective user-base and a unified software architecture.
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Figure 1.2: Schematic of a typical mix system with a number of senders, receivers, and
remote servers. The routing scheme is arbitrary, and each router within the network
is a mix.
1.4 Research Questions
As a step towards addressing the issues discussed in the previous section, this thesis
aims to answer four related research questions which attend to various parts in the
design of mixnets. Figure 1.2 shows an abstract illustration of a typical mix system
with the typical components and users. The system, through the collaboration of a
number of routers (i.e. mixes), anonymises the communications among the senders
and receivers. The symbol of server shown in the diagram exemplifies an entity that
both receives and sends data through the ACS. We start by focusing on the internal
design of the mix. The first two research questions concentrate on this aspect of
mixnets as shown in Figure 1.4. We first revisit the design of Binomial Mix [24] which
was the first design that introduced randomness to the behaviour of a mix. Due
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Figure 1.3: RQ1 and RQ2 focus on a particular kind of mix, and analyse and extend
that design.
to the random behaviour, adversaries aiming at breaking the anonymity of this mix
can succeed only probabilistically. We consider the security of Binomial Mix against
passive attacks.
RQ1: How resistant is Binomial Mix against passive attacks?
We revisit Binomial Mix to measure its resistance towards the passive attack
previously introduced, and give a particular attention to the operation of the mix
under various traffic conditions. The passive attack against Binomial Mix and its
success ratio was presented in [24], and here we consider whether the same level of
resistance is present under various traffic conditions.
The design of Binomial Mix allows the operation of a single selection algorithm
which leads to two main issues. Firstly, the behaviour of the mix is well-known to
the adversary and closely linked to that of the selection algorithm. Consequently,
the adversary is able to capitalise on that knowledge to build attacks targeting the
weaknesses of specific selection algorithms. Secondly, the mix treats all the passing
traffic equally and thus imposes unnecessary delays, depending on the properties of the
selection algorithm in use, where a higher speed is preferable to a very high degree of
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Figure 1.4: RQ3 and RQ4 focus on the users of the system, and framework routers
and protocol.
anonymity. These issues lead to the second research question considered in this thesis.
RQ2: How can Binomial Mix be made more efficient and secure?
We consider building on the design of Binomial Mix with two goals. Firstly,
to decouple the behaviour of the mix from that of a fixed selection algorithm and
to introduce more uncertainty to the behaviour so as to frustrate the efforts of an
adversary to break the anonymity. Secondly, to find mechanisms enabling the mix to
relay multiple communication channels with desired degrees of security and delay.
Moving beyond the design of mixes in isolation, we then turn our attention to the
mixnets as a whole as shown in Figure 1.4. As discussed in Section 1.3, a common
framework for anonymous communication would allow mixnets to enjoy a range of
benefits. This is the aim of the next research question.
RQ3: How does one build a generic framework for the mix-based Anonymous
Communication Systems (i.e. mix systems)?
We consider the requirements that a generic framework needs to satisfy, and aim to
build a framework accordingly. We do not aim to construct a new ACS, but, instead,
seek to build an anonymous network of anonymous networks whereby various mixnets
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can merge, hiding against each other, can satisfy multiple security and efficiency
requirements and address the challenges discussed in Section 1.3.
The architecture and design of a generic framework consist of multiple components.
It is also important to build a system that is not only generic but is also secure and
reliable. The next research question is related to one of the security challenges of such
systems, namely, the protection against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
RQ4: How does one protect the circuit-establishment facility of the generic
framework against DoS attacks?
This question is a dependent question on RQ3 . We consider the features of
the framework which together allow the creation of dynamic communication circuits
through the network. We aim to identify the possible DoS attacks on this facility and
propose countermeasures to protect the framework against possible attacks.
A thorough consideration of every aspect of a generic framework and all the
associated attacks is beyond the scope of this thesis. We hope that our proposal
stimulates further research in this domain.
1.5 Outline and Main Contributions
In our work towards answering RQ1 , we discover that Binomial Mix is significantly
more resistant towards the passive attack than previously reported. The results
obtained from our attack simulator shows that the great majority of the adversary’s
findings is, in fact, not genuine results but only false positives. Further analysis of
the findings of the adversary reveals a predictable pattern in the false positive results,
and thereby the existence of additional information which may assist to improve the
attack.
We propose two new mix designs which, as indicated by RQ2 , are built on the
design of Binomial Mix. Multi-Binomial Shared-Pool Mix (MBSP Mix) enables a mix
to accommodate not one but multiple selection algorithms which operate one at a
time. We have simulated a number of scenarios of using multiple selection algorithms
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in one MBSP Mix. The results show that the design of MBSP Mix reduces the link
between the behaviour of any specific selection algorithm and that of the mix as a
whole. It is also shown that, depending on the coexisting algorithms, the MBSP Mix
may enjoy a significant decrease in the traffic delay in comparison with Binomial Mix.
The second design, Multi-Binomial Independent-Pool Mix (MBIP Mix), associates
each selection algorithm with a separate pool of messages and allows the simultaneous
execution of multiple algorithms. Hence, MBIP Mix supports multiple channels of
communication with different selection algorithm and thus different degrees of security
and delay. Analyses of multiple selection algorithms in MBIP Mix show that the mix
can not only cause a significantly lower traffic delay, but can also significantly increase
the cost of carrying out a blending attack to the extent that makes it impractical for
an adversary to do so.
Aiming to answer RQ3 , we propose the architecture and the detailed design of a
generic framework for mix-based anonymous communications. This framework, which
we named Garbled Routing Framework (GRF), consist of a dynamic routing scheme as
well as a dynamic message processing mechanism. Various mix systems can partially
or entirely join the framework in a plug-in based fashion. Three different types of
Message Processors (MPs) enable the framework to host any message-processing logic
that a guest ACS may require. Additional MPs can be deployed in the system through
arbitrary Unified Resource Locators (URLs) or, in a trusted way, through a central
network authority. We analyse the security of the framework, model certain popular
mix systems within the framework, and provide proof-of-concept implementation and
test.
Finally, and in order to answer RQ4 , we analyse the circuit establishment facility of
the generic framework to identify possible DoS attacks. We propose three techniques
to make the framework resilient towards the identified attacks and provide analyses
of what impacts resulted from employing the proposed techniques in the framework.
We show that implementing a combination of these techniques in the system makes
the circuit establishment facility safe against the identified DoS and, the distributed
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counterparts, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks.
1.6 Organisation
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides more information
about the background of the field and the closely related issues. Chapters 3–6,
respectively attend to research questions RQ1–RQ4 of this thesis. In each chapter
we present a detailed account of the issue in question, the relevant background,
the methodologies used to address the problems, the experiments and our findings.
Finally, the thesis will be concluded in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Background
If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy.
—Philip R. Zimmermann
2.1 Introduction
Anonymity research has grown in importance, and the recent revelations about mass
surveillance programs [29] as well as the ever-increasing censorship of Internet access
globally [30] only signify the critical role that research in this area can play in
protecting privacy of global citizens. In this chapter we review the background of
the field of anonymity research and enumerate the possible solutions for achieving
communication anonymity. We will also discuss a set of related topics as noted below.
Organisation The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. We start by
presenting the basic history of research activity in this domain and explaining the
terminology commonly used. This will assist the reader to understand the rest of
this thesis where technical terms are frequently invoked. Section 2.3 presents the
adversarial models and discusses the importance of threat models. Section 2.4 presents
various techniques which are used in this domain for measuring anonymity as provided
by Anonymous Communication Systems (ACSs). In Section 2.5 various issues and
structures of ACSs and the possible applications for these systems are discussed.
Section 2.6 presents the currently available mix designs and discusses their operation.
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Figure 2.1: History of Anonymity Research
Lastly, in Section 2.7 we discuss the existing mixnets and present their architecture
and operation.
2.2 History and Terminology
Central to the anonymity research is hiding the identity of an entity, typically that of
a user or an agent. The most typical form of identity is the name of an entity, that
is, a unique identifier of an individual that allows distinguishing that individual in a
group [31]. In networked systems, the name of an entity may be taken to mean the
Internet Protocol (IP) address, Media Access Control (MAC) address, email address,
phone number or even, in a broader sense, the geographical location of that entity.
Anonymous is the state of an entity in the absence of information identifying
its identity. The ultimate goal in anonymity research is to make the desired entities
absolutely anonymous. Although few works predate it, the work of Chaum [8] is widely
recognised as the first and most influential system to provide anonymity. Since then,
anonymity has grown to become a very active field of research. Figure 2.1 shows the
number of anonymity publications according to IEEE Xplore1 [32] and the Freehaven
bibliography2 [33]. It can be seen that the interest in anonymity research has grown
- particularly in the last decade.
Pseudonymity is the state of being, firstly, anonymous and, secondly, associated
1The results are obtained by searching for publications with ‘anonymous’ or ‘anonymity’ in their
metadata.
2The Freehaven bibliography is an authoritative collection of selected publications maintained
online.
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with a false name. It is important to note that an entity that is associated with
pseudonyms is not necessarily anonymous because the communication channel per se
leaks information that can reveal the identity of the entity (e.g. the corresponding
IP or MAC address) even when pseudonyms are in use. Pseudonyms are particularly
useful in systems that need to track users, such as where reputation and history of
users are essential to the operation of the system.
There are multiple forms of anonymity that a system can achieve, namely, sender,
receiver, communication and location anonymity. Sender anonymity is achieved where
none of the messages received by the communicating parties in the network can
be linked to any particular sender identity. DC-Nets, which will be discussed in
Section 2.5.4, achieve sender anonymity. Receiver anonymity is achieved where none
of the messages sent by the communicating parties can be linked to any particular
receiver identity. Systems that achieve receiver anonymity include broadcast systems
[34, 35] and private information retrieval [36].
Communication anonymity, which is also referred to as relationship anonymity,
is where no communication or message in the system reveals a relationship between
two entities in the system. Further, no two communications or messages can be
linked. Sender and receiver anonymity are stronger properties than communication
anonymity because in the latter it is clear that the entity in question is indeed
participating in some form of communication [37]. Mix systems or mixnets, which
will be discussed in Section 2.7, achieve communication anonymity.
Other terms are also used in this domain which we briefly mention here.
Unobservability is defined where not an identity but an item of interest is in question
[3]; and can be achieved in a system that not only provides anonymity, but also
uses cover (dummy) traffic. The role and impact of cover traffic will be discussed
in Section 2.5.5. Sender unobservability and receiver unobservability exist where
it is undetectable if a message is, respectively, sent by a sender or received by a
receiver. Communication unobservability exists where communications between two
groups cannot be detected.
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2.3 Defining Adversary and Threat Model
In anonymity research, an agent whose aim is to degrade or eliminate anonymity is
commonly referred to as an adversary or an attacker. The intent of an adversary is to
link a message to a particular sender or receiver identity, find the link between senders
and receivers, or find the origin or destination of messages.
Anonymity is achieved in relation to a particular adversary with specific
capabilities and level of presence. Therefore, it is important to define the properties of
the assumed adversary, also referred to as defining the threat model, prior to designing
or evaluating a particular ACS. Standard terms are used to define various adversarial
models which are reviewed in this section.
A global adversary is omnipresent and has access to all nodes and links in the
network and therefore has complete knowledge about the system. This is in contrast
with a local adversary who only has a limited presence in, access to, and knowledge
about the network. A passive adversary is one who can only observe the links and
nodes, as opposed to an active adversary who can also alter the content of the channels.
An external adversary is one who does not have access to the internals of the system,
whereas an internal adversary is an insider who has access to and knows about the
internals of the system.
The ultimate capable adversary constitutes one who is internal and external, local
and global, and active and passive. However, protecting against such an adversary
leads to unrealistic designs, and ACSs are thus usually designed in accordance with a
realistic threat model and aligned with the actual requirements in the circumstances.
2.4 Measuring Anonymity
A good deal of research has focused on various means to measure anonymity in
different contexts. Protection of the anonymity of data is one of the most important
problems to consider; that is, how data about individuals can be disseminated without
compromising their privacy. The most popular approach to measure the anonymity
of data is k-anonymity [38, 39]. In order to address the limitations of this work,
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numerous extensions and advancements were proposed later such as p-Sensitivity [40],
l-diversity [41], t-closeness [42], an average version of t-closeness [43], δ-disclosure [44]
and differential privacy [45].
Where anonymous communication is in question, it is important to note that the
capabilities of the considered adversary affect the degree of anonymity that can be
achieved by a system. For this reason, anonymity metrics are often modified according
to the assumed threat model (see Section 2.3). Further details about different threat
models are available in [46].
In this section, we present a brief review of the available metrics for measuring
communication anonymity. There are three main approaches to measuring
communication anonymity proposed in the literature; namely, anonymity set,
individual anonymity degree, and entropy-based metrics. The detail of these
approaches is presented hereunder and is followed by a brief mention of the less
common alternative metrics.
2.4.1 Anonymity Set
The traditional way of measuring anonymity in an ACS is through measuring the size
of the anonymity set [20, 47]. The size of the anonymity set is the size of the group of
senders (for sender anonymity) or receivers (for receiver anonymity) which are equally
likely to have sent or received a message.
Assuming that the adversary knows the number of potential senders (or receivers)
N prior to an attack, and has compromised C senders during the attack, then the size
of the anonymity set is n = N − C. This quantifies the level of anonymity achieved
after an attack.
2.4.2 Individual Anonymity Degree
From the point of view of the adversary, the individual anonymity degree is defined in
certain possible states shown in Figure 2.2. This qualitative description of anonymity
was first presented in the proposal of Crowds [48].
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Figure 2.2: Individual Anonymity Degree Scale [48]
Assume that an adversary wants to discover the sender of a particular message.
The highest possible degree of anonymity is absolute privacy where it appears to
the adversary that no one in the ACS ever sent any message. The next state, beyond
suspicion, which is the highest achievable degree of anonymity, is the state that no-one
seems more likely to have sent a message than anyone else. Beyond suspicion is also
referred to as total anonymity or strongly probabilistic.
In probable innocence, the entity in question appears to the adversary to have a
50% chance of being the sender; namely, it is equally likely for that entity to not be the
sender of the message. The next state, possible innocence, is when there is a non-trivial
chance that someone other than the entity in question has sent the message. Exposed
is when there is a non-trivial chance that the entity in question has sent the message.
Finally, provably exposed is when the attacker is absolutely certain and can prove that
a certain entity is indeed the sender of the message.
2.4.3 Entropy-Based Anonymity Metrics
Shannon’s entropy [49], which measures the level of uncertainty in a set of data, has
been used to propose entropy-based metrics for measuring anonymity in ACSs [50, 51].
These metrics consider the global anonymity of an ACS, measure how random the
probability distribution is, and can be used to describe the average degree of anonymity
or uncertainty of an ACS.
Closely related to these approaches is another metric that uses Shannon’s
entropy to quantify the anonymity of mixnets considering the observations of some
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compromised nodes [52]. Further, another work formalised the notion of unlinkability
by using Shannon’s entropy [53].
On the other hand, it is also argued that metrics should consider the worst-case
scenario instead of Shannon’s entropy [54, 55] which contemplates the average case.
In another work, communication anonymity is measured by using Shannon’s entropy
and min entropy [56]. Similarly, in [57] Shannon’s entropy, min entropy and Hartley’s
entropy are used and a generalisation of those techniques, the Re´nyi entropy, is
proposed.
2.4.4 Other Metrics
Alternative to probabilistic anonymity metrics are possibilistic or nondeterministic
metrics such as those proposed in [58–60]. These metrics define anonymity to be
equivalent to the inability of the adversary to link an entity to its actions with absolute
certainty. A combinatorial approach is proposed in [61] which counts the number of
possible one-to-one exchanges between a group of senders and a group of receivers.
Limitations and extensions of this approach can be found in [62]. A detailed study of
anonymity metrics and a theoretical framework for privacy preserving systems can be
found in [63].
2.5 Anonymous Communication Systems
In this section, we review various models of ACSs and their architecture. We firstly
look at the possible network structures that an ACS can have. We also discuss the
differences between two distinct categories of ACS; namely, wireless and wired. We
then present the details of the three main models of ACS; that is, trusted relays and
the darknets, DC-Nets and mixnets. Lastly, we review the possible applications of
ACSs.
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2.5.1 Network Structure
Regardless of the system in use, communication anonymity can be achieved mainly
in any of the three ways as shown in Figure 2.3. In the peer-to-peer (P2P) model,
as shown in Figure 2.3(a) and 2.3(b), the sender may be connected to multiple other
peers. This approach achieves sender and communication anonymity provided that
the peers are not compromised and the communication is not tapped [34].
The third approach, known as mixnets which will be further discussed in
Section 2.7, does not achieve sender anonymity because the senders can be traced to
the input of the mixes as shown in Figure 2.3(c). Mixnets only achieve communication
anonymity.
The solution presented in Figure 2.3(a) is particularly suitable for broadcast
communication as proposed in [47] and [34]. Such a system achieves unconditional
sender and receiver anonymity [34, 35]. The solution presented in Figure 2.3(b)
requires all the network nodes to participate in the system even if they do not
have anything to communicate [9]. The resulting system is suitable for low-latency
communication (such as [48] and [23]), but the communication channels can be
disrupted by any single node that is participating in it.
When compared to mixnets (Figure 2.3(c)), the other two solutions provide less
security against a powerful and omnipresent adversary. Further, mixnets are more
scalable, robust and efficient in comparison with the P2P solutions [9].
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2.5.2 Wireless vs Wired Anonymity
Research aimed at the protection of communication privacy broadly falls in two
categories, namely, wireless and wired. The wireless anonymous communication
research focuses either on the protection of privacy or location information in
stationary sensor networks [64–66] or the protection of anonymity of mobile users
in last-hop wireless networks [67–69].
In this research, we focus on the wired ACSs. These ACSs have been extensively
studied [8, 26, 34, 47], and usually consist of a set of nodes collaborating to achieve
communication anonymity. Contrary to the wireless networks, wired ACSs usually
assume the network topology is fixed or known to the attacker [70].
2.5.3 Trusted Relays and Darknets
ACSs that rely on trusted nodes are the simplest form of systems that provide
anonymity and have been used for a wide range of applications. In these systems,
a sender trusts an intermediary node with its identity and that node relays the
communication between the sender and the receiver. As the intermediary node learns
the identity of the communicating parties, such systems are vulnerable to internal
attacks. Moreover, the intermediary node may be forced to reveal the identity of
communicating parties. In fact, such an event took place in relation to Penet remailer
(anon.penet.fi) [15] where a court of law ruled that the identity of communicating
parties be disclosed by the system administrator [10]. Other examples for the use of
trusted relays include web proxies (e.g. [71]) and VPN servers utilised for re-routing
traffic (e.g. [72, 73]).
A closely related class of systems are the darknets which are also referred to as
friend-to-friend (F2F) networks [74–76]. Darknets, which must be distinguished from
the deep web [77], are networks that operate based on various degrees of mutual trust
and trust delegation [78] among the users, and serve a wide range of purposes such as
digital content sharing [79–83] and traffic re-routing [84–86].
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2.5.4 Dining Cryptographers Network (DC-Net)
Dining Cryptographers Network (DC-Net) [47, 87] enables a sender to use
broadcasting to send a message to multiple receivers and achieves perfect sender and
receiver anonymity [35, 47]. This approach does not rely on re-routing of messages
to offer anonymity and is based on a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Therefore, this
protocol requires no extra information necessary for re-routing traffic, and achieves a
lower delay [88].
No-one in the system will find out who the sender of a message is, and the receiver
receives the message under certain circumstances (odd parity). However, due to the
use of broadcasting, only one sender can send a message. There is also a scalability
issue as the participants require significant coordination and synchronisation for
sharing secret coin flips [37]. These shortcomings make DC-Nets unscalable and
impractical.
2.5.5 Mixed-Based Schemes
In this thesis we focus on mix -based systems, a specific class of ACSs, which has
been widely used and subjected to extensive analysis and research. In this section, we
present a brief introduction about this class of ACS and the related common attacks.
Later, in Sections 2.6 and 2.7, we will provide details about the existing systems.
The Mix (Chaumian Mix)
The original mix design proposed by Chaum [8] was briefly described in Section 1.2.2.
This design is the most influential design which has had the greatest impact on research
work developed thereafter. Most of the ACSs proposed later are variants of the original
Chaumian mix.
Figure 2.4(a) shows a mix which receives messages through I1 · · · I5 and relays
batches of messages through O1 · · ·O5 such that there is no correlation between
the incoming and outgoing messages in terms of appearance and flow. The
inability of linking input and output messages based on their appearance, a.k.a.
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Figure 2.4: A Mix and its Inputs and Outputs [9]
bitwise unlinkability, can be achieved through the use of cryptographic techniques
(encryption and/or decryption) and, where a change in the size of messages can
disclose sensitive information, by message padding.
In order to remove the information that can disclose the link based on the flow
of traffic (e.g. timing and volume), messages can be reordered or delayed. This is
shown in Figure 2.4(b) where multiple messages arrived at a mix in various times
(T1 · · ·T5), and are dispatched simultaneously and in a batch in Tout. The dispatch of
the messages, according to the specifics of the design, may be triggered by different
conditions such as time interval or threshold.
Mixnets
Based on the degree of anonymity required in a system, multiple mixes may be
interconnected to form a network of mixes or mixnets. Each of the mixes in a mixnet
performs mixing, as discussed in the previous section, and then relays the batches of
messages to another mix or to the final destination.
Based on the design of the mixnet, the mixes may be connected in either of two
different topologies to form a network, namely, cascades (fixed-route) and free-route.
In mix cascades, as shown in Figure 2.5(a), the communication path goes through
the same path and through a set of fixed mixes in a sequential order. The free-route
mixnets, also known as peer-to-peer (P2P) mixnets, as shown in Figure 2.5(b), allow
the communication to be anonymised by going through any of the several available
paths in the system.
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Figure 2.5: Mix Topologies [9]
A considerable body of previous works was dedicated to exploring the different
aspects of these two mixnet topologies and weighing their advantages and
disadvantages [25, 89–91]. Overall, the cascade topology is generally considered more
secure. However, under certain conditions, the free-routing topology provides a more
robust anonymity [90].
Attacks on Mixnets
In this section, we review the common types of attacks against ACSs; namely, passive
attacks, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, tagging attacks, probabilistic attacks and,
finally, the infamous (n− 1) attacks.
Passive Attacks Mixes can be vulnerable to a number of different types of
passive attacks. Most simply, the attacker may launch a brute force attack; that
is, he may choose to follow every possible path the message could have possibly
taken [46]. However, it is apparent that a brute force attack requires access to
the entire communication channel while also imposing a great cost to the adversary.
In a different type of attack, the adversary may also be able to learn about the
communicating parties by watching the timing of the incoming and outgoing messages
if such information is not eliminated by the mix. Similarly, it is possible to degrade
anonymity by watching the communication patterns, counting packets, or relying on
the observation that users typically communicate with a relatively small number of
parties [46].
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Probabilistic Passive Attacks An adversary can use probabilistic techniques
to discover the relationship between the messages travelling through the network.
When a single mix is the target of such attacks, the aim of the adversary is to find
probabilistic correlations between the messages going into the mix and the ones which
are flushed out. In Chapter 3, where we analyse the resilience of Binomial Mix [24]
against passive attacks, we consider the probabilistic attacks. As we shall see in
Section 2.6.7, Binomial Mix uses randomness in its selection algorithm and thus the
adversary can only succeed probabilistically.
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks Disrupting the network and rendering some
mixes inoperable can make ACSs unreliable to use. Such a disruption in the network
can also result in the change of behaviour of certain communicating parties and thus
leak information about who is talking to whom [46].
Message Tagging If the first and last mixes are controlled by the adversary, he
can tag the messages in the beginning of the path. When the tagged message reaches
the end of its journey, the last mix can distinguish it from other messages and thus
eliminate its anonymity [46].
(n − 1) Attack Many anonymity systems aim to protect their users against global
and local active attackers, and regard the (n−1) attack (a.k.a blending attack, flooding
attack or spam attack) as a vulnerability [92]. The (n − 1) attack consists of two
phases. In the first phase, the emptying phase, the attacker targets a message Mt
that is heading a mix. He delays Mt as well as all the other messages heading that
mix. Simultaneously, he floods the mix with enough messages to force the flush of the
messages inside the mix. Afterwards, the attacker proceeds to the second phase of the
attack known as the flushing phase.
In the flushing phase, the attacker sends the delayed messageMt along with (n−1)
other messages of his own to the mix. Once Mt leaves the mix, the attacker can
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distinguish it from the messages of his own and thus the anonymity provided by the
mix will be eliminated.
The (n − 1) or blending attack allows an attacker to identify the receiver of
a message with absolute certainty [92]. It is important to note that this attack
compromises the anonymity provided by a single mix and does not relate to the rest
of the nodes in the mixnet. Therefore, it is an inherent assumption that the attacker
is powerful enough to be able to isolate and trace a particular message [92].
Cover Traffic A mix may produce cover (dummy) traffic to protect the anonymity
of real messages [93]. That is, one or more dummy messages, made to be
indistinguishable from the real traffic to the eyes of the adversary, may be inserted
into the stream of messages before the mix flushes. Different strategies may be used
by mixes in producing cover traffic, some of which make the work of the adversary
significantly more costly [92]. Although cover traffic is usually generated by the mixes,
it can also be created by users which can improve the security of the network [94].
In the case of the (n − 1) attack, although the adversary will be able to perform
the emptying phase without any trouble, he cannot achieve the same level of certainty
in the flushing phase in the presence of cover traffic [92]. When the mix flushes the
targeted message (Mt), it will be accompanied by at least one other (dummy) message
and thus the adversary’s knowledge is reduced at least by half.
Nevertheless, if the adversary is able to keep tracking all of those messages to their
destinations, he can eventually distinguish Mt because only that message will end up
in the hands of a receiver and all the dummy messages will end up in other mixes [92].
Evidently, conducting this attack would be significantly more costly for the adversary.
It is interesting to briefly mention some other strategies for using cover traffic that
can make attacks more difficult [92, 95]. Consider, for example, that the mix may
specify different path lengths for each dummy message, or that some of the dummy
messages may be destined for the receivers instead of other mixes.
It must nonetheless be highlighted that the use of cover traffic imposes significant
overheads to the network because a considerable amount of bandwidth will be
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consumed not for exchanging real data but solely for providing more security. Further,
some strategies may involve generating cover traffic even when the parties do not
have anything to communicate (see, e.g., [93]), which may not be desirable for all the
participants. Further analysis and discussion about cover traffic and its limitations
can be found in [96].
2.5.6 Applications and Other Systems
ACSs are used for a wide range of applications and many existing systems have been
developed as free or commercial products. Not all of these systems have been subjected
to vigorous research and analysis; nevertheless, they mostly leverage one or more of
the ACS-models discussed in the previous sections. Here we look at the potential
applications of these systems, and enumerate a number of the systems which are
currently in use by a considerable number of users.
Electronic Voting When Chaum published his seminal work about anonymous
communication in 1981 [8], he cited voting as a possible application. A large body
of research [97–107] has been dedicated to building a class of mixes which provides
robustness and verifiability in order to assure senders that the network has processed
their messages properly [10]. These properties are closely linked to voting because
privacy and verifiability of vote delivery are crucial in this context.
Email Building systems to provide anonymous email communication has been an
active field of research. Pseudonymous email relays, such as [15, 108], offered a lower
degree of anonymity. Anonymous remailer came later, such as [15, 17, 19, 109], have
gained popularity and addressed many shortcomings and security flaws. Another
notable project in relation to the exchange of anonymous and/or pseudonymous emails
is [110].
File Sharing Many software applications have been developed to address different
levels of privacy required for file sharing. The Tor network [26] has been used by
some for file sharing. However, it has been suggested that this methodology does not
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protect the anonymity of users [111]. Many other systems are available for file sharing
that fully or partially anonymise users, such as [112–114].
Re-Routing, Copyright Protected Material, and Censorship Re-routing
of traffic can be desirable for a variety of reasons such as gaining access to
copyright-protected material and circumventing Internet censorship. Many providers
restrict the access to the material they provide based on the location of the visitors
due to copyright protection requirements. Location is usually determined from the
Internet Protocol (IP) address of the visitors. In order to gain access to the otherwise
inaccessible material, Internet users can use servers that re-route traffic. By so doing,
these users pretend to be located where the re-routing servers are. Traffic re-routing
is also one of the primary means to circumvent Internet censorship because it can
simply deceive the censoring firewalls into believing that users are visiting legitimate
destinations. That is, the firewall can be deceived by the act of re-routing into
believing that the user is not communicating sensitive material as the (encrypted)
packets are being exchanged with an unknown entity (i.e. the re-routing server). The
OpenNet Initiative [30] regularly conducts research to expose and analyse Internet
filtering and surveillance practices on a global scale [115–118].
Tracking and Profiling Avoidance Tracking and profiling the activities of
Internet users is a widespread practice and a major invasion of privacy. Multiple
advanced and sophisticated techniques exist to carry out these types of activities,
such as the use of web cookies and digital fingerprinting [119, 120]. ACSs obfuscate
communication patterns and thus protect Internet users from becoming the subject of
tracking and profiling. Nevertheless, some attacks have been reported to be effective
on ACSs [121–124].
Anonymous Payments Protecting the privacy of financial transactions has long
been the goal of the cryptographic community, dating back to 1983 [125]. However,
the traditional electronic transactions require a central and trusted entity, which have
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hindered the development and adoption of anonymous electronic transactions. With
the rise of decentralised electronic currencies such as Bitcoin [1], the need for a central
authority has been eliminated and ACSs can now play a more effective role in providing
anonymity to financial transactions. A whole body of research has been dedicated to
this need (see, e.g., [126–128]).
Other Applications There is a number of other applications for ACSs. It can
provide a safe communication channel for many, such as journalists, military personnel,
whistle-blowers, law enforcement officers, parents seeking online privacy for their
children, and human rights and political activists. Freedom of speech, in particular,
has been the reasoning behind building many systems (see, e.g., [129–131]). While
noting the importance of ACSs and their various and numerous applications, we should
also mention that this technological tool, akin to any other tool built by humanity,
can be used for malicious and/or unethical reasons.
2.6 Existing Mixes
In this section we present a review of the mix designs that are most commonly cited
in the literature. Our focus is to describe how each mix operates and how much delay
is imposed by each mix on the transmission of messages.
2.6.1 Threshold Mix
Threshold Mixes wait until they receive n messages and then they flush all the
messages at once [92]. The minimum delay caused by a Threshold Mix is ǫ for the
scenario where a message arrives when the mix has already received n − 1 messages
and thus flushes instantly. The maximum delay can be infinite because the mix may
not receive enough messages to meet the threshold and thus the messages may remain
in the mix. The mean delay, assuming a constant rate of arrival r, can be computed
according to n−12r .
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2.6.2 Timed Mix
Timed Mix (TM) flushes in specific time intervals (e.g. every t seconds) whereby every
message in the mix will be flushed [92]. The minimum delay is ǫ which occurs for a
scenario where a message arrives just before the time interval. The maximum delay
is t − ǫ which occurs if a message arrives right after a flush. The mean delay is t2 .
In Chapter 4, we use TMs where we consider various combinations of mixes that can
coexist within our proposed mix designs.
2.6.3 Threshold and/or Timed Mix
Threshold and time parameters can be combined in a mix. In Threshold and Timed
Mixes, in every time interval t the mix flushes its messages but only if there are at
least n received messages [92]. The minimum delay is similar to Timed Mix, ǫ, and
the maximum delay is similar to Threshold Mix - infinite.
In Threshold or Timed Mixes, in every interval t the mix flushes all of its messages,
but it also flushes all of its messages at any time if at least n messages have been
received regardless of whether the interval has been met [92]. The minimum and
maximum delays are similar to Timed Mix, that is, ǫ and t− ǫ respectively.
2.6.4 Threshold Pool Mix
Pool Mixes contain a pool inside the mix with the capacity of n messages, and in
the flushing time only a subset of the messages inside the pool is chosen by the
selection algorithm to be dispatched. A Threshold Pool mix always maintains f
number of messages, i.e. the threshold, inside the mix. The retained messages are
chosen uniformly at random [92]. The mix flushes n messages when n + f messages
accumulate in the mix.
The minimum and maximum delays are similar to those of Threshold Mix, namely,
ǫ and infinite, respectively. Due to the probabilistic nature of the mix, there is a low
chance that a message may remain in the mix for an arbitrarily long time. Therefore,
the mean delay is 1 + f
n+f . Assuming an average rate of receiving r messages per
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second, the average delay is (1 + f
n+f )
n
r
.
2.6.5 Timed Pool Mix
Timed Pool Mix (TPM) [92], similar to TM, has a periodic flushing time. It does not,
however, flush all its messages and retains f messages chosen in a uniformly random
fashion in the pool in every round. If in the flushing time no more than f messages
are accumulated in the mix, it will not flush any messages.
The minimum delay is ǫ, and the maximum delay is infinite because insufficient
traffic may result in the mix never flushing the messages in its pool. Similar to
Threshold Pool Mix, it is possible, though very unlikely, that messages can remain
in the pool for an arbitrarily long time. TPMs will be used in Chapter 4 where we
evaluate combinatorial models.
2.6.6 Timed Dynamic-Pool Mixes (Cottrell Mix)
Timed Dynamic Pool Mix (TDPM) [92] is similar to TPM in that its flushing time is
according to a fixed time interval t. TDPM retains a number of messages in the pool
in every flushing iteration. However, the number of flushed messages is not fixed but,
instead, is relative to the number of messages inside the pool.
Assume TDPM contains m + fmin number of messages in the pool. In the
flushing time, the mix will flush messages only if the number of messages in the pool
are higher than a threshold fmin, that is, where m > 0. If that condition is met,
TDPM flushes either a fraction of m+ fmin or one (1) message, whichever is higher.
The minimum delay that can be imposed by a TDPM is ǫ, and the maximum
delay is infinite. The mean delay is as high as that of a TPM and typically higher.
TDPMs, too, will be used in our evaluations in Chapter 4.
2.6.7 Binomial Mix
Binomial Mix [24] is known as the first design that introduced randomness to the
behaviour of the traffic mixers. This design is a particular type of TDPM which
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relies on the normal Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) to choose the subset of
messages that should be flushed in an iteration.
The operation of Binomial Mix is as follows [24]. Let the number of messages that
the mix flushes be s, which, on average, is equivalent to nP (n). s follows a Binomial
distribution, and thus has a variance equivalent to np(1− p), where p is the result of
the function P (n).
Using the normal CDF is suitable because of its desired properties. In low traffic
conditions, the normal CDF increases the delay of the communication and retains the
messages in the mix for a longer period. This increases the anonymity in low traffic
conditions as the messages will not be flushed merely due to a forced time interval.
In heavy traffic conditions, the normal CDF decreases the delay of the
communication and allows a higher throughput. Consequently, Binomial Mix achieves
a lower delay than the TDPM in heavy traffic conditions, but this comes at the cost
of providing lower anonymity because then the messages are very unlikely to stay in
the mix for more than one round.
Due to the probabilistic nature of Binomial Mix, the adversary does not obtain
much information about the number of messages inside the pool by observing the
incoming and outgoing messages of the mix [24]. Therefore, attacks on Binomial
Mix are not exact and can succeed only probabilistically. In Chapter 3 we will
revisit the design of Binomial Mix and re-examine its resilience towards probabilistic
passive attacks. In so doing, we will be taking into account the impact of various
traffic conditions on the success rates of the attack. In Chapter 4 we extend the
design of Binomial Mix and propose two new models which achieve greater security
and efficiency. Further details about the operation of Binomial Mix and the relevant
attacks will be presented in the respective chapters.
2.6.8 Stop-and-Go Mix
Stop-and-Go (SG) Mix [20] is different from other models discussed in the previous
sections, in that it does not operate by batching messages. Instead, SG Mix relies on
the delay built into the message by the sender. The delay is specified according to an
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Exponential distribution. When an SG Mix receives a message, it delays the message
for the specified time and then relays it.
The design of SG Mixes was aimed at minimising the potential for (n−1) attacks.
Another interesting property of SG Mixes is that, due to the independence of network
messages, it is possible to blend high- and low-latency traffic in the same system.
However, it is shown that SG Mixes provide no anonymity in extreme cases of low
traffic because they do not adapt the delay to the traffic conditions [132].
2.6.9 Alpha Mix and Tau Mix
Alpha Mix [21] is an approach that generalised SG mixing with the aim of enabling
mixes to blend high- and low-latency traffic. The sender considers its security
requirements and accordingly makes a trade-off between security and communication
delay.
In Alpha Mix, the sender of a message M specifies in the message the number
of batches that a mix must process before it can relay M . Tau Mix differs in that
M contains not the number of batches but the number of messages that must be
processed before M can be relayed by the mix.
2.6.10 RGB Mix
RGB Mix [133] sends heartbeat messages to themselves through the network. This
approach protects against the (n−1) attack because the heartbeats will not be received
if the mix is under the first phase of the attack, namely the emptying phase. As a
countermeasure, the mix injects cover traffic to confuse the adversary. The details of
(n− 1) attack and the impacts and limitations of using cover traffic were discussed in
Section 2.5.5.
2.6.11 Verifiable Mixes
Mixes with universal verifiability properties are a dedicated field of research into the
development of systems that assure the senders that their messages have been properly
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processed. More information about verifiable mixes can be found in [102, 103, 105–
107, 134, 135].
2.7 Existing Mixnets
This section contains a brief overview of the most important mixnet designs that exist
to date. It will discuss the details of the systems which have been widely adopted by
users and/or been distinctly influential in the developments of the field.
2.7.1 Anonymous Remailers
The Chaum’s mix was designed to anonymise email messages. Multiple systems were
proposed later which used mixnets to anonymise emails. Early attempts to anonymise
email messages (Type 0) resulted in the creation of pseudonymous remailers such as
Penet remailer (anon.penet.fi) [15]. Second generation of remailers (Type I), known
as Cypherpunk remailers, were a very weak version of the Chaumian mix [15]. In
the third generation (Type II), Mixmaster [16, 17], provided protection against traffic
analysis by using techniques such as message reordering and padding. Finally, the
fourth generation (Type III), Maximinion [18, 19], additionally provided bidirectional
communication and is extremely resistant to traffic analysis [10].
2.7.2 Onion Routing and Tor
Onion Routing [136–139] is a variant of mixnets which is suitable for low-latency and
interactive communication (e.g., Secure Shell (SSH) and web browsing). This system
provides sender, receiver and communication anonymity.
In an Onion Routing network, the sender encrypts each message multiple rounds,
similar to the layers of an onion as shown in Figure 2.6, and then sends it to the first
Onion Router in the cascade. The first router decrypts the message with its private
key, and retrieves the routing information for the second router in the chain as well as
the encrypted message that it must relay to the second router. There are five Onion
Routers in the chain that repeat these actions until the last one sends the message to
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Figure 2.6: Structure of an Onion Message: the message consists of multiple layers of
encryption performed using the public keys of the intermediary routers. When each
layer is removed, the Onion Router extracts the routing information for the next hop
as well as the message that must be relayed.
its final destination. The system is implemented at the application or Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) layer, and forward secrecy is protected by relying on standard
secure communication protocols.
The second generation of Onion Routing, The Onion Router (Tor) [26, 140, 141],
uses free-routing instead of cascades. In the new design, the number of routers in a
circuit has been reduced to three. At the time of writing, Tor is a popular anonymous
network with a large user-base. Tor is a mature ACS and its various aspects and
properties have been subject to vigorous and ongoing research (see, e.g., [142–149]).
2.7.3 Freedom Network
The Freedom Network closely follows the architecture of Onion Routing. Details of the
architecture of the system were published in a series of technical papers [150–153]. It
offered sender anonymity for web browsing and could also be used for electronic mail,
Secure Shell (SSH), Telnet and Internet Relay Chat (IRC). The network topology
used in this system was the cascade model.
Freedom Network was efficient and reasonably secure against DoS attacks but
was vulnerable to generic traffic analysis. This system was a commercial service
designed and operated by Zero-Knowledge Systems Inc., a Canadian company, and
was discontinued in 2001.
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2.7.4 Garlic Routing
Garlic Routing [154, 155] is a variant of Onion Routing [137]. A Garlic message, similar
to an Onion message as shown in Figure 2.6, contains multiple layers of encryption
which should be peeled by the intermediary routers while in transit. After each router
peels a layer of the message, instead of an onion it finds multiple garlic bulbs to
transmit.
Each bulb contains an alternative and complete path from the router to the
destination. Hence, Garlic Routing provides path redundancy and, therefore, delivery
reliability and robustness.
2.7.5 I2P Network
The Invisible Internet Project (I2P Network) [27, 28] is a mixnet suitable for
low-latency communication. I2P is based on Garlic Routing and uses the term cloves
to refer to the bulbs. The communication paths in the I2P Network are unidirectional,
and the path establisher can choose the number of hops in a path and whereby makes
a trade-off among anonymity, latency and throughput.
I2P Network uses a Kademlia-like [156] Distributed Hash Table (DHT) as its
network database to store and disseminate information about routers and particular
destinations.
I2P Network is not designed to access an arbitrary destination over the Internet.
However, it is possible for a node to become an exit relay to share its Internet access
with the other anonymous nodes in the network.
Various aspects of I2P Network have been subject to analyses and research such
as its security [157–160], availability [161] and usage [157, 162].
2.7.6 Tarzan
Tarzan [163, 164] is a peer-to-peer ACS that works in Internet Protocol (IP) layer and
achieves sender, receiver and communication anonymity. The communication circuit
through the network is dynamically created by the sender. Cover (dummy) traffic
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is used to provide additional security. Failure of a communication tunnel results
in significant delays and computation overheads [165]. Tarzan provides application
independence, is suitable for Web surfing and has the benefit of using less processor
intensive symmetric keys.
2.7.7 MorphMix
Morphmix [22, 23] has a very similar architecture and threat model to that of Tarzan.
The circuits through the network, however, are not created by the sender. Instead,
intermediary nodes specify the routes, and their actions are observed by witnesses
which are specified and trusted by the senders.
The choice of delegating circuit establishment to the other nodes is made in order
to prevent a subverted node from choosing the path such that it only goes through
other subverted mixes. Collusion detection and prevention mechanisms are built into
the system but are not effective in every case [166].
2.7.8 Crowds and Hordes
Suitable for Web surfing, Crowds [48, 167, 168] is a mixnet that uses the name jondos
to refer to its mixes. Hops of a communication channel in Crowds are extended by
mixes in a random (but biased) fashion in each hop. This achieves sender anonymity
and removes a single point of failure in the channel. Communication anonymity
can also be achieved, although it can be nullified if the sender reveals identifying
information in the request [169].
Hordes [170] improves the design of Crowds. Unlike Crowds, which uses HTTP
proxies as mixes, Hordes uses User Datagram Protocol (UDP) proxies. Another
difference is that Hordes achieves sender anonymity through using multicast reverse
paths.
2.7.9 ISDN, Real-Time and Web Mixes
Mixes were used to anonymise telephone conversations over the Integrated Services
for Digital Network (ISDN) [11]. This usage of mixes was practical as it met the
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requirements of ISDN networks. Later, a generalised version of this design was
proposed which could be used for real-time and low-latency communication [12].
These designs were further improved and modified to form Web Mixes [13] which
were suitable for anonymous web browsing and was implemented in a web anonymising
proxy called JAP [14].
2.7.10 Other Mixnets
There are other systems which leverage the concept of traffic mixers. WonGoo [171] is
a scalable P2P system based on Crowds for low-latency communication. This system
relies on random forwarding and layered encryption, and provides strong anonymity
and high efficiency. For a comparison of WonGoo, Crowds and the pure mix, refer to
[172].
Cashmere [165] relays traffic through robust groups of mixes to provide a resistant
anonymous layer on a structured P2P overlay. Cashmere achieves sender and
communication anonymity, and its design can be extended to offer receiver anonymity.
2.8 Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter we have presented a broad overview about the important and relevant
topics in relation to the anonymity research. We have seen that this field of research
is becoming increasingly popular as the activity in the field clearly demonstrates. We
reviewed the terminology and adversarial models commonly considered in this field,
and considered the different anonymity metrics proposed in the literature.
As we have seen, ACSs can be built to address various degrees of anonymity
according to their use cases. They range from simple and trusted traffic relays to
sophisticated systems that use traffic mixers, or mixes, to achieve anonymity. We also
briefly reviewed the wide range of applications for ACSs.
Due to the focus of this thesis, we presented a more detailed review of the existing
mix designs. Among the available designs, Binomial Mix is capable of making traffic
analysis more difficult by relying on a probabilistic selection algorithm. Consequently,
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the behaviour of the mix is less predictable to the adversary and therefore less
knowledge is available for building attacks. In Chapter 3 we further analyse Binomial
Mix and examine its resistance against probabilistic passive attacks. In Chapter 4 we
take a step further and propose two new mix designs based on Binomial Mix.
Finally, in this chapter we also looked at the existing and most extensively
researched mixnets. It is apparent that the discussed mixnets are architecturally
different and use various message-processing techniques. We also know that a mixnet
with a larger number of users can potentially offer greater anonymity. In Chapters 5
and 6 we propose a framework system for merging various mixnets such that they can
protect their distinct algorithms and designs but also enjoy the company of the users
of other ACSs.

Chapter 3
Passive Attacks on Binomial Mix
They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.
—Benjamin Franklin
3.1 Introduction
Many years after the initial mix was proposed by Chaum [8], a number of improved
designs have been proposed in the literature [5, 132]. Among these proposals, Binomial
Mix [24, 173], which for the first time introduced randomness to the behaviour of a
mix, is the most sophisticated design.
The focus of this chapter is to answer Research Question 1 of this thesis (see
Section 1.4). Specifically, we focus on the passive attack previously reported in [24]
which aims to guess the number of messages contained in a Binomial Mix and, using
additional computation, to break the anonymity provided by the mix. Since the
operation of Binomial Mix involves randomness (see Section 3.3.1 for details) the
attacker needs to observe the operation of the mix a number of times before it can
guess, and only probabilistically so, the number of messages contained in the mix.
Such an attack was simulated and it was reported that the attacker needs typically
about 200 rounds of observation to succeed [24].
The degree of anonymity provided by Binomial Mix strongly correlates with the
network traffic conditions. That is, a higher incoming traffic volume yields a lower
degree of anonymity (and a lower delay). We note that the previously simulated attack
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did not take into account the correlation between the traffic volume and the resultant
anonymity. In this chapter, we revisit the attack and closely examine the impacts of
the noted correlation.
Our findings demonstrate that Binomial Mix is significantly more resilient to the
attack than previously reported. That is, the reported success rate of the attack is
verified only in low traffic conditions. The results also show the unreliability of the
attacker’s findings as the attack in fact never results in failure but in a large number
of false positives instead. Nevertheless, the false guesses may provide additional
knowledge which might be used to improve the attack. Lastly, the impact of dropped
messages, in heavy traffic conditions, on the success rate of the attack is shown.
Organisation The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The following section
defines the threat model used in this chapter. Section 3.3 contains the required
background about the operation of Binomial Mix, the terminology used in this chapter
and the definition of the passive attack in question. The details of the simulation and
incoming traffic ratios are presented in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 we present the
highlights of the experimental results and discuss the outcomes of the experiments
and the corresponding observations. Section 3.6 elaborates on the effectiveness of the
passive attack on Binomial Mix in light of our findings. In Section 3.7 we suggest
possible venues for extending our work and examining other interesting situations.
Lastly, Section 3.8 presents a summary of this chapter.
3.2 Threat Model
It is important to note that one assumes the capabilities of the adversary have
fundamental impact on the anonymity that can be achieved by a particular
Anonymous Communication System (ACS). In other words, the anonymity provided
by an ACS can be measured only by assuming a certain threat model, and the results
are no longer valid if the threat model changes.
We assume a passive attacker, that is, one who can observe all the incoming
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Figure 3.1: Schematic of Binomial Mix
and outgoing traffic of the mix without any limitations and knows all the internal
parameters of the mix. However, he cannot actively tamper with the traffic, i.e. to
add, remove, delay or modify messages. Neither can he carry out internal attacks -
namely, break into a mix and see the internal flow of the traffic. We also assume that
the attacker does not have a priori or contextual information about the correlation
between the incoming and the outgoing messages.
3.3 Background
3.3.1 Binomial Mix
A schematic of Binomial Mix is shown in Figure 3.1. The mix receives a number
of messages through different channels (i.e. IC1 · · · ICn) and stores them in a pool.
The batching strategy of the mix consists of one selection algorithm which in each
flushing time tosses a coin for every message in the pool to decide whether it must be
taken out and relayed. The coin is biased according to the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) of the Normal distribution, Φ(N), where N is the number of messages
within the pool. The messages remaining in the pool along with the newly received
messages will be tried in the next flushing time.
The effect of using the normal CDF to bias the coin is that an increase in the
incoming traffic volume translates into a higher probability of success in the Binomial
distribution, and thus into a higher outgoing traffic ratio and a lower anonymity. In
low traffic conditions, however, the probability of messages staying in the mix rises
and the outgoing traffic is thus relayed with a higher delay and a higher anonymity.
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Table 3.1: Terminology Used for Defining Passive Attacks on Binomial Mix
Sign Meaning
i Number of the round of the attack
A Number of incoming messages at the start of the round
N Number of messages in the pool (assuming A)
Nmax Maximum capacity of the pool
S Number of outgoing messages (assuming N)
ai, ni and si Where multiple rounds of attack is in question, this notation
represents the actual values of the corresponding random variables
in a particular attack round i (e.g. a1 denotes the actual number of
received messages in the first round of the attack.
3.3.2 Passive Attack on Binomial Mix
As mentioned before, due to the probabilistic nature of its selection algorithm, attacks
on Binomial Mix are also generally probabilistic; that is, the attacker will observe the
incoming and outgoing messages of a mix and try to correlate them using probabilistic
techniques. In more sophisticated attacks, i.e. the active attacks, the attacker may
also tamper with the incoming messages to short-circuit the process.
In order to define the passive attack on Binomial Mix, we must first define the
information which is of interest to the attacker. Table 3.1 contains the terminology
used for representing one round of mix’s operation.
The attacker can observe A and S, and we assume, according to the threat model
(see Section 3.2), that he knows the value of Nmax. He wants to find the value of
N , or more specifically n1, to be able to correlate, with some certainty, the incoming
and outgoing messages and thus to degrade the anonymity provided by Binomial Mix.
According to the known properties of the Binomial distribution [174], given N = n,
the attacker is able to compute the probability of S = s by:
P (S = s|N = n) =
(
n
s
)
ps(1− p)n−s (3.1)
However, N is not known to the attacker and he must estimateN from his observations
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of S. According to the Bayes’ theorem we have:
P (N = n|S = s) =
P (s|n)P (n)
P (s)
=
P (s|n)P (n)∑Nmax
i=0 P (s ∩ i)
(3.2)
=
P (s|n)P (n)∑Nmax
i=0 P (s|i)P (i)
According to the threat model, the attacker does not have any a priori knowledge
and thus must assume that all of the possible values of n are equally probable (i.e.
P (n) = P (i)). Hence, he initially must assume that:
P (N = n) =


1
Nmax−s+1
if s ≤ n ≤ Nmax
0 otherwise
(3.3)
Hence, the Equation (3.2) can be simplified as follows:1
P (N = n|S = s) =
P (s|n)∑Nmax
i=s P (s|i)
(3.4)
Although with a single observation the attacker gains very little information about
n1, he can improve his knowledge by observing multiple outputs (i.e. s1, s2, · · · ) to
eventually estimate n1 with a certain probability. His goal would be to find a value
for n1 that maximises Equation (3.4). To this end, after each observation of si the
attacker needs to find the probability of every possible value of n1. That is, he must
compute P (N = n|S = s), ∀n ∈ N : s ≤ n ≤ Nmax according to Equation (3.4).
The attacker needs to combine what he has learnt from each observation and, since
each observation is independent of the others, he only needs to multiply the results of
different observations. It is important to note that, due to the differences in incoming
and outgoing traffic in each round, the value of N is likely to be different from one
round to another. Hence, the computed probabilities need to be shifted according
to relative changes in the values of N before these values can be multiplied to the
1The denominator mentioned in Equation (2) of [24] is
∑Nmax
i=s P (i|n). This is due to a typo in
[24], because that denominator could only be derived based on a wrong assumption, i.e. P (s) = P (n).
Moreover, had that denominator been used as the basis of the simulation, the attack simulator may
have generated no results.
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results obtained from the previous observations. Further details about this algorithm
are available in [24].
It has previously been reported [24] that one round of observation allows the
attacker to guess the value of N with a probability of up to 15%. It has also been
reported that the attacker needs approximately 200 rounds of observation to be able
to guess the value of n1 with a probability of at least 95%. These results were
obtained from a simulator which combined the results of multiple rounds of attacker’s
observations.
We have implemented a simulator according to the described algorithm in [24] and
[173], and conducted further experimentation. We have taken into account the impact
of traffic volume on the success rate of the attack. Details of the findings are reported
in Section 3.5. Let us first explain the experimental scenarios in the following section.
3.4 Incoming Traffic Relative to the Capacity of the
Mix
We pay particular attention to the incoming traffic (A) relative to the maximum
capacity of the mix (Nmax), and analyse its impact on the passive attacker’s effort at
estimating the number of messages in the pool (N). According to the threat model,
the attacker is aware of the internal parameters of Binomial Mix, and we thus assume
a fixed maximum capacity Nmax = 20 which is also known to the attacker. We then
study five scenarios with, respectively, an incoming traffic equal to 10%, 25%, 50%,
75% and 90% of the maximum capacity. The incoming traffic, in accordance to the
widely accepted assumption in the field, is Poisson distributed.
A single round of attack starts from the attacker’s first observation, continues
with the consecutive observations which improve the attacker’s knowledge, and ends
when the attacker becomes capable of estimating the value of n1 with at least 95%
confidence. To obtain reliable results, we have conducted 500 rounds of attack
simulation for each incoming traffic ratio. In each round the attacker is allowed up to
1000 observations of the traffic and the attack will be marked as failed if he cannot
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Figure 3.2: Incoming Traffic Samples
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Figure 3.3: Outgoing Traffic Samples
estimate n1 after exhausting all of his observations.
Figures 3.2(a)–(c) show the average of the incoming traffic in three of the five
scenarios where the parameter of the Poisson distribution λ is respectively set to
Nmax
10 ,
Nmax
50 and
Nmax
90 . Figures 3.3(a)–(c) show the average of the output traffic of
the mix for the same scenarios. Figures 3.4(a)–(d) show the average of the overall
performance of the mix in terms of the average number of messages in the pool in
relation to the incoming and outgoing traffic.
3.5 Analysing the Experimental Results
The previous sections presented the details of the attack as well as our experimental
scenarios. We have built a simulator using the Java programming language and
conducted the experiments. This section analyses the various results obtained from
the simulator.
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Figure 3.4: Average of Overall Performance of Mix in Experimental Scenarios. Each
of the plots shows the volume of incoming messages (the black + signs), outgoing
messages (the red × signs) and the number of messages in the pool (the green ∗ sign).
3.5.1 Impact of Traffic Volume on Attacker’s Success
The results obtained from the scenarios mentioned in Section 3.4 are shown in
Figures 3.5(a)–(e). Each figure contains a number of interesting items which can
be understood with the following guides.
• The black dots show the number of rounds before the attacker could successfully
estimate the value of n1.
• The red dots show the false positive results; that is, when the attacker estimated
the value of n1 with a probability of at least 95% but his estimation was in fact
wrong.
• The black horizontal lines show the mean of the number of times that the
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Figure 3.5: Attack Simulation Results. It is observable that an increase in the traffic
ratio has a direct impact on the decrease of the successful attacks (i.e. the black +
signs) and the increase of false positive results (i.e. the red × signs).
attacker is required to observe the mix before reaching a correct estimation.
• The red vertical lines show the total number of wasted efforts, i.e. false positives,
relative to the total number of attack simulations.
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Observing the outcome of the attack simulations leads to a number of interesting
conclusions.
1. Not every purported success is a true one. The results show that a notable
number of attacker’s attempts lead to an incorrect value of n1. The previous
examination of Binomial Mix did not distinguish between the true successful
attempts and the false positives [24] and the reported success rate is thus
assumed to constitute only correct estimations. The recognition of the false
positive values is important because it shows that the mix is significantly more
resistant towards the passive attack than previously reported.
2. The higher the traffic ratio, the more false positives. Comparing the results of
different scenarios shows that an increase in the ratio of the incoming traffic
volume to the capacity of the mix, and especially where higher than 25%, leads
to a decrease in the number of successful attacks an increase in the number of
false positive results. This indicates that an increase in the incoming traffic ratio
leads the attacker to believe that he is making better guesses, whereas in fact
he is more likely to receive more false positive results.
3. No failure, regardless of ratio of the traffic volume. It is interesting to observe
that the attacker will never fail to find an estimated value with 95% confidence.
However, it can also be observed that an increase in the ratio of the traffic volume
results in a lower number of required observations before the 95% confidence is
achieved. Knowing this behaviour of the attack, the attacker must discard the
results obtained from the attack found with a traffic ratio of higher than 25%.
As we shall see in Section 3.5.2, these results can be improved by taking into
account other factors.
4. The lower the traffic ratio, the more observations required. The earlier
examination of the attack reported that the attacker requires approximately
200 observations to estimate the value of n1 with 95% confidence [24]. Our
experiments show that the number of required observations is, in fact, a function
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of the ratio of the incoming traffic to the capacity of Binomial Mix and thus may
vary significantly in different traffic conditions. Where the incoming traffic is
approximately equal to 10% of the capacity of the mix, the attacker may require
up to 179 observations to reach an estimation; whereas with traffic equal to
approximately 25% of the capacity of the mix, the attacker may require only
up to 53 observations. This includes the correct guesses as well as the false
positives.
5. Approximately 60% of all the efforts are wasted. If we combine the results
obtained from all the attack simulations, it would be a total 2500 rounds. As
shown in Figure 3.5(f), the total wasted efforts are 15132500 . That is, assuming
a uniform randomness of the traffic ratio during the attacker’s observations,
approximately equal to 60% of the attacker’s attempts. This is important as it
signifies the low certainty in the findings of the passive attacker which is notably
lower than was previously reported. Figure 3.5(f) also shows the average rounds
of observation in successful attacks, i.e. 24.22, and in the false positives, i.e.
13.08.
3.5.2 Attacker’s Best Guess in Failure
The results presented in the previous section demonstrate that a large proportion of
the attacker’s attempts will lead to misleading results, and that the passive attack
is thus not as effective on Binomial Mix as previously believed. In this section we
pay closer attention to the results the attacker obtains in false positive guesses, and
contrast them with what he must have found had the attack been successful.
We seek to understand how far the wrong guesses usually are from the true value
of n1. To this end, we have assumed a constant designated value n1 = 10 to be able
to collect simulation results that allow aggregation. Note that we have executed the
simulation with purely random values assigned to n1 and reached consistent results
with what was reported in Section 3.4. We then assumed a constant value for n1 to
be able to find the frequency distribution of the wrong guesses.
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(f) Aggregated Results of 2500 Rounds
Figure 3.6: Attacker’s Best Guess in Failure. The red vertical bars show the
distribution of falsely identified results, and the black vertical bars show the successful
attack results.
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Figures 3.6(a)–(e) show the frequency distribution of the attacker’s estimates for
three of the examined scenarios. In every chart, the sum of the frequencies is equal to
the total number of simulated attacks, i.e. 500. The black bars represent the number
of correct estimates which, consistent with the designated value, always appears in
the centre of the chart. The red bars represent the frequencies of estimates wrongly
pointing to certain other values. Figure 3.6(f) shows an aggregated report of only the
wrong guesses in all the 2500 rounds of experiment.
Our observations and findings are as follows:
1. Wrong estimates are mostly very close to the true value. When the traffic ratio
is between 10% and 25% of the capacity of the mix, the wrongly estimated values
are all equal to nine; that is, the closest possible lower estimate. This pattern
persists with higher traffic ratios, albeit other wrong estimates also appear in
the results. As shown in Figure 3.6(d), a significant portion of the total wrongly
estimated values is only one unit less than the correct estimation.
2. The higher the traffic ratio, the further the wrong estimates are from the true
value. As the traffic volume increases, the range of the wrong estimates widens
in a non-uniform manner. The attacker’s wrong guesses are never higher than
the designated value; namely, in our examples no result fell within the range of
11–20. Neither do the wrong estimates ever fall below half of the designated
value. That is, in our example no result is less than 5. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the wrong estimates only fall within the range of [n12 , n1 − 1].
3.5.3 Dropped Messages
According to Equation (3.4), the maximum capacity of the mix (i.e. Nmax) affects the
estimates that the attacker computes. As in our experimental scenarios the λ of the
Poisson distribution of the incoming traffic is a fraction of the Nmax, it is conceivable
that in high-traffic scenarios the number of incoming messages A, or the sum of the
incoming messages and the ones still in the pool (i.e. A + N), exceeds Nmax. In
these cases the mix is forced to drop the excessive messages. This accords with real
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Figure 3.7: Messages that the Mix Dropped
life scenarios because it cannot be guaranteed that the capacity of the mix is always
larger than the sum of the messages in the pool and the incoming messages.
It is important to note that the attacker can only observe the incoming A and
outgoing S messages, but the number of messages inside the mix N is unknown to
him. Hence, he cannot tell which incoming message, if any, was dropped and which
made it to the pool and may thus appear among the outgoing messages. It is also
important to note that Binomial Mix uses the CDF function as the bias of the binomial
distribution [24] and, consequently, the number of dropped messages is expected to
be very low.
Analysis of the data generated by the simulator indicates that the mix does not
drop any messages with a traffic ratio of less than 25% of the capacity of the mix.
In higher traffic conditions, as shown in Figures 3.7(a)–(c), the number of dropped
3.5. ANALYSING THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 55
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
N
um
be
r o
f D
ro
pp
ed
 M
es
sa
ge
s
Traffic Ratio
Total in Success
Total in False Positive
Figure 3.8: Aggregated Data on Traffic Ratio vs Dropped Messages
messages varies between 1 and 7.
3.5.4 Impact of the Dropped Messages
As discussed in Section 3.5.3, employing the CDF as the bias of the selection algorithm
leads to dropping some messages during heavy traffic conditions. In this section, the
overall impact of the amount of dropped messages on the success rate of the attack is
analysed.
We have aggregated the total number of dropped message in all 500 simulation
rounds for every traffic ratio and correlated the summations with the success rate of
the attacks. The result is shown in Figure 3.8.
It is important to observe that successful attacks occur only when there is no
dropped message. As Figure 3.8 shows, the number of dropped messages in all the
successful attacks is equal to zero regardless of the incoming traffic volume ratio. It
follows that a correlation exists between the number of dropped messages and the
success rate of the attack.
The properties of the CDF does not allow a large number of dropped messages,
but using a different bias function in the mix may result in a much higher loss of the
messages, and thus a less reliable communication compared to the results shown in
Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.9: Aggregated Data on Traffic Ratio vs Attack Success
In the ACSs that use dummy traffic to further obfuscate the channels, network
routers may generate and/or drop the dummy messages. Our results indicate that in
such ACSs the passive attack will not produce any results for the attacker.
In order to build a more effective passive attack, the shortcoming of the attack in
presence of dropped messages should be addressed. One possible solution would be to
estimate the number of dropped messages based on the traffic volume. Nonetheless,
a precise estimation, and generally adding other possible computations, imposes an
extra processing cost on the attacker which can be prohibitive.
3.6 Effectiveness of the Attack on Binomial Mix
We have simulated 2500 attacks and an aggregated set of data about the success rate,
as shown in Figure 3.9, reveals interesting information about the behaviour of the
attack.
As mentioned in Section 3.5.1, approximately 60% of the attacker’s attempts are
wasted, which, as shown in Figure 3.9, mostly occur when the traffic ratio is more
than 50% of the capacity of the mix.
It is interesting to observe that there is a drastic fall in the attack’s success rate
as the traffic volume grows from the ratio of 25% to 50%. A traffic volume equal to
37.50% of capacity of the mix results in an equal number of correct estimates and
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false positives.
It can also be observed that the 95% confidence in the correct results only exists
where the traffic ratio is below 13.75% of the capacity of the mix. With a traffic ratio
above 75%, the attacker does not have any realistic chance of making any correct
estimation.
According to the stated observations, it can be concluded that the attacker can
confidently rely on the results from the passive attack only when the traffic ratio is
below 13.75% of the capacity of the mix.
In Section 3.5.2 we noted that when the traffic ratio is below 50%, the attacker
can still be reasonably confident that the wrong estimations of n1 are mostly one
message less than the true value. Combining this knowledge with the results shown in
Figure 3.9 leads to the conclusion that the attacker can be reasonably confident about
the outcome of the attack as long as the traffic ratio is below 50% of the capacity
of the mix. As the traffic ratio grows, however, so does the range of possible wrong
estimates, and therefore the knowledge about the probability distribution of wrong
estimates becomes less useful.
3.7 Possibilities for Further Research Work
In addition to our examination of Binomial Mix, explained in this chapter, further
possibilities for research work in this area may be explored. In particular, we think
that our work can be extended in at least in three ways.
• Non-Poisson distributed incoming traffic. In our experiments, a Poisson
distribution is used to generate the simulated incoming traffic. This approach
is widely accepted in the field and is also aligned with the experiments of
the original Binomial Mix proposal [24]. Nevertheless, analysis of the traffic
of two practical mix designs revealed that such an assumption may not be
entirely correct [95]. It is therefore desirable to examine the effectiveness of the
passive attack when the incoming traffic is distributed in a non-Poisson manner.
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• Randomness with other bias functions. As stated earlier, the original design
of Binomial Mix uses the normal CDF to determine the bias of the Binomial
distribution. Other closely related designs were proposed: e.g. Binomial+,
Logarithmic, and Square Root mixes. These differ from the original design
mainly in the function used to determine the bias of the distribution [175]. It
would be interesting to examine how effective the passive attack is on these
designs.
• Improving the attack algorithm. In this chapter we focused on studying the
success rate and the behaviour of a known attack. Given the results presented
here, one might be able to improve the attack explained in Section 3.3.2 in order
to produce a more efficient and effective attack.
3.8 Summary of the Chapter
In order to answer Research Question 1 of this thesis (see Section 1.4), we have
revisited and re-examined Binomial Mix, which was the first design to introduce
randomness to the operation of a mix.
We built a Java-based simulator to analyse the effort of a passive attacker in
breaking the anonymity provided by the mix. In particular, we focused on studying
the impact of the incoming traffic volume as a function of the capacity of the mix.
Five traffic volumes relative to the capacity of the mix were considered: 10%, 25%,
50%, 75% and 90% of the maximum capacity. In each traffic condition the rate of
success of the passive attack was measured.
It was shown that the relative increase of the incoming traffic ratio significantly
reduces the attacker’s ability to launch successful passive attacks. However, we also
found that the passive attack proposed in [24] never results in failure. Instead, it
results in up to 60% false positive results. It follows that the known passive attack
is not as robust as previously thought and that consequently Binomial Mix is much
more resilient towards such attacks.
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In spite of the existence of a high false positive rate, the attacker can improve
the attack algorithm in order to achieve better results by taking into account the
probability distribution of the false positives. This is possible because the wrong
results always fall within a predictable range of values. This technique is effective for
incoming traffic ratios of below 50% of the capacity of the mix.
It was also shown that a Binomial Mix which uses the normal CDF as its
bias function will be forced to drop messages in heavy traffic conditions. We showed
that the passive attack can only be successful where there are no dropped messages.
The analysis and experimentation presented in this chapter can be extended to
consider other possible scenarios. One may consider non-Poisson distributed incoming
traffic to examine other network traffic conditions. It would also be interesting to
discover the behaviour of other bias functions (i.e. other than the CDF) towards
the passive attack. Another interesting possibility is to leverage the findings of this
research to build a more efficient attack algorithm.
In Chapter 4 we will focus on other aspects of this mix. Specifically, we will address
the need for a higher efficiency and improve the design in order to make it resilient
towards active attacks.

Chapter 4
Multi-Binomial Mixes
If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.
—Justice William J. Brennan
4.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is to answer Research Question 2 of this thesis; that is, we
aim to improve the efficiency and security of Binomial Mix design.
As noted in Chapter 2, Binomial Mix was the first design of a mix that used
randomness in its operation. Consequently, the attacks on Binomial Mix can succeed
only probabilistically. In Chapter 3 we examined that design against probabilistic
passive attacks in various traffic conditions and noted its strengths. Nevertheless,
choosing an appropriate function to specify the bias of the Binomial distribution used
in the mix is challenging. There is a trade-off between the degree of anonymity a
Binomial Mix can achieve and the delay it imposes on the communication channel.
The bias function used in the original design, for example, is the normal
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) [24]. That function offers a desirably low
delay but an undesirably low degree of anonymity in heavy traffic conditions [175].
Moreover, employing one bias function, and particularly when it strongly correlates
with a publicly known parameter (i.e. the traffic volume parameter of the CDF),
provides the adversary with credible information which forms the foundation on which
various types of attacks can be built. We further elaborate on this issue in Section 4.4.
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Another interesting aspect to consider is that Binomial Mix treats all the passing
traffic equally and, consequently, low-latency channels suffer significantly more from
the delay caused by the anonymisation process. Depending on the bias function, the
delay may render the mix unusable for low-latency channels.
In this chapter we propose two new mix designs which extend the design
of Binomial Mix to address these shortcomings. We name the first design
Multi-Binomial Shared-Pool Mix (MBSP Mix) and the second design Multi-Binomial
Independent-Pool Mix (MBIP Mix). Both these traffic mixers are built on the notion
of using not one but multiple message selection algorithms. Each selection algorithm
relays the messages randomly according to an independent Binomial distribution with
potentially different bias functions. The following illustrate the advantages of this
approach.
• Less credible information is made available to the adversary, and the mix is thus
more resistant to both active and passive attacks.
• The shortcomings of one particular bias function (e.g. the delay and degree of
anonymity) can be compensated for by the coexistence of multiple functions.
• In the case of MBIP Mix, a single mix may concurrently anonymise both high-
and low-latency traffic channels.
Organisation The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The following section
defines the threat model used in this chapter. Section 4.3 presents further details about
Binomial Mix and the related attacks. In Section 4.4 we discuss why making a less
predictable mix increases the degree of anonymity, and how this may be achieved.
Sections 4.5–4.6 respectively present the designs of MBSP Mix and MBIP Mix. Each
of these sections also provides analyses of the predictability of the mix’s behaviour,
its traffic delay and its resistance towards the passive attack and the blending attack.
Lastly, Section 4.7 presents a summary of this chapter.
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4.2 Threat Model
We assume an active attacker as well as a passive attacker. That is, an adversary can
observe all the incoming and outgoing traffic of the mix and knows all the internal
parameters. He can also actively tamper with the traffic; that is, add, remove, delay or
modify messages. However he can only carry out external attacks: he cannot observe
the internal traffic flow of the mix in question and does not know the parameters
dynamically set through the encrypted negotiations with other network nodes. We
also assume that the attacker does not have a priori or contextual information about
the correlation between the incoming and outgoing messages.
4.3 Background
The operation of Binomial Mix was described in Section 3.3.1. Since this chapter
presents new mix designs which extend the design of Binomial Mix, in this section we
recap the main related issues.
4.3.1 Binomial Mix
Binomial Mix contains only one selection algorithm. In each flushing time, the mix
tosses a coin for each message in the pool to decide if that message should be relayed
to the next node in the network. The next node may be another traffic mixer or the
final destination of the message. The other the messages are kept in the pool to be
tried in the next flushing iteration. A schematic of the main elements of Binomial
Mix is shown in Figure 4.1.
The coin is biased so that messages will not be stalled in the pool for an unduly
long period. The bias of the coin, and consequently the number of rounds messages
may remain in the pool, is specified by a bias function which, naturally, has a direct
impact on the traffic delay caused by the mix in various traffic conditions. As we shall
see in the following sections, the bias function also has a direct impact on the degree
of anonymity that a mix can achieve.
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Figure 4.1: Schematic of Binomial Mix
The proposal of the Binomial Mix design used the CDF of normal distribution
as a potential bias function [24]. That is, Φ(N), where N is the number of messages
within the incoming pool in each flushing iteration. Using this function in low traffic
conditions results in a lower probability of success and thus a higher traffic delay and
a higher degree of anonymity. In heavy traffic conditions the normal CDF achieves
the opposite results [175].
4.3.2 Passive Attack on Binomial Mix
Due to the probabilistic nature of Binomial Mix, attacks on that mix can succeed
only probabilistically. In other words, the active attacker observes the incoming
channels (i.e. IC1 · · · ICn in Figure 4.1) and outgoing channels (i.e. OC1 · · ·OCm),
and attempts to break the anonymity of the mix by correlating the incoming and
outgoing messages through probabilistic techniques.
The details of the passive attack were presented in Section 3.3.2. Here we adopt the
same terminology (see Table 3.1) to only reiterate the main goals of a passive attacker.
The attacker can observe the number of incoming messages at the start of each
round (A) as well as the number of outgoing messages (S). He aims to learn the
number of messages in the pool (N) with some degree of certainty. If he can compute
the number of messages in the pool in the first round of the attack, namely n1, he will
be able to break the anonymity provided by Binomial Mix.
According to the threat model (see Section 4.2), the attacker does not have any a
priori knowledge. This implies that in the first round of attack the existence of any
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number of messages (i.e. between 0 to Nmax) in the pool is equally probable. Hence,
the probability of n number of messages being in the pool given the observation of
s number of messages leaving the mix can be computed according to the following
equation.1
P (N = n|S = s) =
P (s|n)∑Nmax
i=s P (s|i)
(4.1)
The attacker requires multiple observations before he can compute a value for n1
that maximises Equation (4.1). The attacker needs to combine the knowledge learnt
from each observation as explained in detail in Section 3.3.2.
4.3.3 Blending and (n− 1) Attacks on Binomial Mix
An active attacker not only can see the messages passing through a mix but also can
manipulate them. That is, to insert arbitrary messages, or modify, remove or delay
the existing ones. One type of active attack, known as the blending attack, has proved
to be notoriously difficult to foil. Most existing systems cite this attack or the (n− 1)
attack, which essentially is one instance of the blending attack and is the most difficult
to counter, as a vulnerability [92]. This attack was discussed in Section 2.5.5. As we
will use this attack in our evaluations in this chapter, the following presents a recap.
In the (n−1) attack, the attacker aims to compromise the anonymity of a particular
message Mt by tracing it through the mix. There are two phases in the attack: the
emptying phase and the flushing phase. During the emptying phase the attacker
prevents any unknown message from entering the mix while also flooding the mix
with a large number of self-generated, and thus identifiable, messages. This step is
meant to force the mix to flush nearly all of the unknown messages already existing
in its pool.
Secondly, during the flushing phase, the attacker allows the message Mt to enter
the mix followed by n attacker-generated messages (and hence the name (n−1) attack)
while still preventing unknown messages from entering the mix. Once Mt leaves the
mix, the attacker will be able to identify it and compromise its anonymity.
1For more information about how this equation is derived, refer to the detailed discussion in
Section 3.3.2.
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It was shown in [176] that, despite the aim of Binomial Mix to reduce the knowledge
available to the attacker about the number of items in the pool, the mix is still
vulnerable to the blending attacks. For a detailed analysis of the resistance of the
currently available mix designs towards the blending attack, the curious reader is
referred to [176].
4.4 Towards Reducing the Adversary’s Knowledge
It is material to examine the underlying knowledge and assumptions that enable an
adversary to carry out attacks on Binomial Mix. It must be noted that the design of
Binomial Mix is publicly known and the attacker thus knows that:
1. there is a fixed and periodic flushing time;
2. the selection algorithm relies on randomly choosing messages from the incoming
pool;
3. the randomness is according to a Binomial distribution;
4. the randomness is not fair;
5. the mix has a certain and known capacity (i.e. Nmax); and
6. the bias function is strongly correlated with the number of incoming messages
and in accordance with the normal CDF (or other potentially suitable
bias functions such as Binomial+, Logarithmic, and Square Root mixes [175]).
This knowledge is the cornerstone of the attacks on Binomial Mix such as the one
described in Section 4.3.2. Specifically, the knowledge items 1–3 above allow building
an attack according to the known properties of the Binomial distribution; that is, the
computations shown in Equation (4.1). The knowledge items 4–6 above inform the
attacker that in certain conditions the mix may be offering a significantly lesser degree
of anonymity, such as where the normal CDF results in a very low degree of anonymity
under heavy traffic conditions as described in [175]. Such known properties may be
exploited to improve existing or to build new attacks.
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An important question to consider is whether the degree of knowledge available
to the attacker could be reduced. This could be naively achieved by a design with
inherent properties not readily available to the attacker, which in effect is to achieve
security through obscurity. This approach is undesirable because the security of the
traffic mixer will be compromised once the attacker learns the obscured properties.
A more robust approach would aim to remove or weaken the aforesaid knowledge
items not by obscuring the design properties but by building properties with inherent
dynamic behaviour so as to remove the grounds for such fundamental assumptions.
For example, had Binomial Mix been designed to use not a fixed bias function but
a function randomly picked from a set of suitable functions, the attacker would not
have been able to make any firm assumptions about the known weaknesses of the used
function. Further, had the bias function been chosen differently from one flushing time
to another, he would not have been able to, or would have gained very little additional
information to be able to, improve his knowledge about the bias function by observing
multiple iterations. Naturally, each of these approaches has associated implications in
terms of traffic throughput and delay which warrant careful consideration.
In the rest of this chapter we consider certain scenarios that decrease the knowledge
available to the attacker by studying new variations of Binomial Mix.
4.5 Multi-Binomial Shared-Pool Mix (MBSP Mix)
MBSP Mix, shown in Figure 4.2, employs n Binomial distributions each of which
have an independent and potentially differing success probability value denoted by
x1, x2 . . . xn.
In each flushing time, an MBSP Mix randomly chooses one selection algorithm
and tosses a coin for each message in the incoming pool. The coin is biased
according to the bias functions associated with the Binomial distribution of the chosen
selection algorithm. The selected messages are then relayed.
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Figure 4.2: Schematic of Multi-Binomial Shared-Pool Mix (MBSP Mix)
4.5.1 Output Predictability
The original Binomial Mix design proposed to use the normal CDF to determine the
bias of the coin. Thus, from the attacker’s point of view, the probability of a particular
message leaving the mix, P (S), was independent of any other parameter except the
number of messages in the pool. In the case of MBSP Mix, however, the mix may use
a different bias function in each flushing time which may or may not have a correlation
with the number of messages in the pool.
In MBSP Mix, the value of P (S) in each flushing time may be equal to either of
the values within the range x1 · · ·xn depending on which selection algorithm (denoted
by C) is in operation. The probability of a particular message leaving the mix is
a function of one particular selection algorithm Cα being in operation and of its
associated probability of success:
P (S) = P (Cα)·xα (4.2)
MBSP Mix can randomly choose any available C, and the value associated with
P (Cα) is thus determined based on a distribution which specifies how likely it is for
a particular C to be selected in any given flushing time. Assuming that every C is
equally likely, for n selection algorithms we have:
P (S) =
1
n
·xα (4.3)
More generally, from an external observer’s point of view (such as an attacker) the
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Figure 4.3: Performance of MBSP Mix
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average probability of a particular message leaving the mix is:
P (S) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi (4.4)
In order to understand the behaviour of MBSP Mix, we have compared its output
predictability with that of Binomial Mix in a number of different configurations. We
have assumed a Binomial Mix uses the CDF as its bias function, which is the function
used in the original design of Binomial Mix. We have also assumed that all the
available selection algorithms are equally likely to contribute to the output.
Figure 4.3 shows the predictability of the output of an MBSP Mix containing two
selection algorithms: i) one which uses the CDF bias function, and ii) one which relies
on a Uniform distribution to determine the bias.
It is observable that while MBSP Mix still relays a higher number of messages
in high-traffic conditions, it behaves much less predictably than Binomial Mix. The
unpredictability can be seen more easily in Figure 4.4 where multiple observations of
the attacker are contrasted every time the message pool has a certain size (i.e. when
150 messages are in the pool). While Binomial Mix’s expected behaviour remains the
same in all the observations, MBSP Mix’s behaviour is far less predictable.
It is seen that the MBSP Mix in Figure 4.3, in contrast with Binomial Mix,
provides a higher degree of anonymity in heavy traffic conditions. This is because
in heavy traffic conditions Binomial Mix simply relays the entirety of the incoming
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traffic and thus provides a significantly lower degree of anonymity. It is important to
note that the MBSP Mix also imposes a lower latency in the low traffic conditions
because the messages do not have to wait for a minimum threshold to be met.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show a similar scenario where an MBSP Mix consists of two
selection algorithms: i) one which employs a Binomial distribution with a normal
CDF as its bias function; and ii) one which employs an Interrupted Poisson Process
(IPP). In this example, the IPP is interrupted 30% of the time and, when active,
selects approximately 85% of the messages to be flushed. The traffic resulting from an
IPP resembles the usual Internet traffic. As shown in Figure 4.5, using an IPP-based
selection algorithm yields a notably less predictable behaviour pattern in comparison
with Binomial Mix.
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The third scenario shows an MBSP Mix that contains a mixture of the two previous
scenarios. It now contains three selection algorithms: i) one which employs a Binomial
distribution with a normal CDF as its bias function; ii) one which employs an IPP;
and iii) one which uses Uniform distribution.
The results can be seen in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. It is observed that the overall
throughput of the mix has increased, that the behaviour of the mix does not resemble
the behaviour of any one of the selection algorithms in isolation, and that a higher
degree of anonymity is achieved in heavy traffic conditions.
4.5.2 Traffic Delay
The average number of rounds that a message may stay in a Binomial Mix is 1
p
. Here p
is the probability of success in the Binomial distribution and is, in a CDF-based design,
computed according to the CDF of the normal distribution. That is, CDF (m), where
m is the number of messages inside the pool. Hence, in Binomial Mix the average
delay of a message is 1
CDF (m) number of rounds. Note that this is relative to the ratio
of incoming traffic as a higher incoming traffic ratio would result in a larger m and
thus a lesser delay.
In MBSP Mix, however, p consists not of the probability of success in
one selection algorithm but of the combination of such probability in all the
selection algorithms. Precisely, it consists of the probability of a particular
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selection algorithm being in operation, P (Cα), and its associated probability of success
xα. Hence, in MBSP Mix with n selection algorithms, the average number of rounds
that a message is delayed is:
rounds =
1
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi
=
n∑n
i=1 xi
(4.5)
Figure 4.9 shows the average delay caused by Binomial Mix based on the pool size.
Figures 4.10–4.12 show the average delay in the three MBSP Mix designs previously
discussed in this section.
It is observed that two of the MBSP Mix designs, shown in Figure 4.10 and 4.12,
cause significantly lower traffic delays in low traffic conditions. That is, approximately
50 rounds of delay in the worst case scenario as opposed to approximately 700 rounds
in Binomial Mix.
A comparison between the two figures also reveals that a higher number of
selection algorithms can lead to a lower traffic delay. It must be noted that the design
shown in Figure 4.12 contains the same IPP which caused significant delays in the
design shown in Figure 4.11. Nevertheless, the coexistence of a uniform distribution
has compensated for the excessive delays.
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4.5.3 Blending Attack
As stated in Section 4.3.3, a blending attack is perhaps the most notorious attack
against mix systems. This section presents a comparison between the cost of that
attack on the CDF-based Binomial Mix versus MBSP Mix. Specifically, we analyse
the cost of attack in the emptying phase as well as in the flushing phase.
Number of Rounds Required in the Emptying Phase
We assume that during this phase the attacker sends NT number of messages to the
mix, and that the attacker chooses NT such that it forces the mix’s selection algorithm
function to be equal to its asymptotic value, pasym. This gives us an upper bound on
how effective the attack can be.
We know from [177] that in Binomial Mix the number of rounds, k, necessary to
flush all unknown messages in the mix with probability 1− ǫ can be estimated using
the following equation:
(1− (1− pasym)
k)G ≥ 1− ǫ (4.6)
where G is the number of unknown messages available in the mix. In the absence of a
priori knowledge about the value of G, which is in accordance with the threat model
(see Section 4.2), we consider the worst case scenario for the attacker where G = Nmax,
that is, assuming that at the beginning of the attack the mix is full of messages.
MBSP Mix allows multiple selection algorithms to operate in sequence, and each
function has an independent asymptotic behaviour which may or may not correlate
with the number of incoming messages. Therefore, in order to estimate the number
of rounds necessary to flush the unknown messages in MBSP Mix with n number of
selection algorithms, the Equation (4.6) must be changed to:
(1− (1−
1
n
n∑
i=1
pasymi)
k)G ≥ 1− ǫ (4.7)
which can also be expressed as:
k =
ln(1− (1− ǫ)
1
G )
ln(1− 1
n
∑n
i=1 pasymi)
(4.8)
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Contrary to the selection algorithms relying on the Binomial distribution, the
value of pasym cannot necessarily be computed for all possible selection algorithms.
For instance, assume a design of MBSP Mix which contains two coexisting
selection algorithms: i) a uniformly random function, and ii) a Binomial distribution
with the CDF bias function. The asymptotic behaviour of the first selection algorithm
does not correlate with the number of messages the attacker sends to the mix.
Therefore, to analyse such an MBSP Mix designs we consider the entire range between
the two possible extreme results of the uniformly random selection algorithm. In other
words, we first consider the case where the selection algorithm chooses no message
from the pool (p = 0), and secondly the case where it chooses the entire message pool
contents (p = 1).
The comparison between the assumed MBSP Mix and the CDF-based Binomial
Mix is shown in Figure 4.13. It is observable that the CDF-based selection algorithm
will be flushed entirely in about one round of attack, which is similar to only the worst
case of the MBSP Mix; that is, where p = 0. In other circumstances the MBSP Mix
demands a significantly larger number of rounds of attack.
Number of Messages Required in the Emptying Phase
We know from [177] that the cost of the attack in terms of the number of messages
that the attacker has to send to a CDF-based Binomial Mix can be computed as:
Messages = NT + (k − 1)(NT +G)pasym (4.9)
As discussed earlier, in MBSP Mix the value of pasym should be computed differently
and therefore the number of messages that the attacker has to send to MBSP Mix is:
Messages = NT + (k − 1)(NT +G)
1
n
n∑
i=1
pasymi (4.10)
Equations (4.9) and (4.10) can be used to compute the cost of the attack for the
attacker in the emptying phase. The results are shown in Figure 4.14. In this example,
the maximum capacity of the mix (i.e. Nmax) is 300 messages.
We observed in Figure 4.13 that the CDF-based Binomial Mix requires only one
round of attack in the emptying phase and, as shown in Figure 4.14, the number of
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Figure 4.13: MBSP Mix, Rounds of Blending Attack in Emptying Phase
messages that the attacker has to send is approximately 300 messages. This resembles
the worst case scenario in MBSP Mix. The highlighted area in the figure shows the
range of the number of messages that the attacker has to send. It is observable that
the cost of the attack for the attacker may increase up to approximately 20 times more
than that of the CDF-based design.
Total Cost of the Attack
We know from [177] that the number of rounds to flush the messages from a CDF-based
selection algorithm is k′ = 1
pasym
. In an MBSP Mix with n selection algorithms, k′
changes to:
k′ =
1
1
n
∑n
i=1 pasymi
(4.11)
Assuming that the attacker has chosen to empty the mix in k rounds and then flush
the message in k′ rounds, the total number of messages that the attacker must send
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Figure 4.14: MBSP Mix, Messages in Blending Attack in Emptying Phase
to the mix is equal to:
Messages = (NT + (k − 1)(NT +G) + (k
′NT + k
′G− 1))
1
n
n∑
i=1
pasymi (4.12)
MBSP Mix is a Timed Mix (TM) and therefore the attacker theoretically needs to
wait t units of time before each round. Hence, the total number of rounds that he
must wait for the two phases of the attack is (k + k′)t.
The total cost of the attack in terms of the messages that the attacker has to
send to the mix is shown in Figure 4.15. The figure compares a CDF-based Binomial
Mix and an MBSP Mix containing two selection algorithms: i) one based on the
Binomial distribution with a CDF bias functions; and ii) one with a uniformly random
algorithm.
It is observable that Binomial Mix has a lower cost for the attacker even if
compared with the worst scenario of the MBSP Mix in which the random function
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Figure 4.15: MBSP Mix, Total Messages in Blending Attack
selects the outputs with p = 1. The area highlighted in Figure 4.15 shows the range of
the number of messages that the attacker must send depending on the assumed value
of k + k′. It is shown that the total cost of the attack is approximately eight times
more than that of the MBSP Mix.
4.6 Multi-Binomial Independent-Pool Mix (MBIP Mix)
MBIP Mix, as shown in Figure 4.16, differs from MBSP Mix in that each
selection algorithm has its own separated pool of incoming messages.
In each flushing time, each selection algorithm decides the fate of every message
in the incoming pool associated with that particular algorithm. Akin to MBSP Mix,
the coin is biased according to the success probability associated with the Binomial
distribution of the selection algorithm in question. The chosen messages are then
relayed to the final destination or another mix.
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Figure 4.16: Schematic of Multi-Binomial Independent-Pool Mix (MBIP Mix)
4.6.1 Output Predictability
In every flushing iteration of MBIP Mix, the probability of a message leaving the mix,
P (S), is equivalent to the product of x1 . . . xn. As the attacker does not know to
which incoming pool a message will be added, an outgoing message could thus, from
his point of view, be the result of any selection algorithm. Therefore, from an external
observer’s point of view, the probability of a particular message leaving the mix, on
average, is:
P (S) =
n∏
i=1
xi (4.13)
In order to understand the behaviour of MBIP Mix, we analysed four hypothetical
designs which combine some well-known selection algorithms. In every scenario, the
behaviour of the MBIP Mix is contrasted with that of a CDF-based Binomial Mix.
Figure 4.17 shows the expectation of the attacker from an MBIP Mix design which
consist of two selection algorithms: i) one based on the Binomial distribution and the
normal CDF bias function; and ii) one with a different bias function, namely the
Timed Pool Mix (TPM).
Although the resultant combination shows a lower traffic throughput and a higher
delay, it must be noted that the actual performance of the mix is not the same as
the attacker’s expectation. In fact, the mix has two separate communication channels
that do not interfere with each other, and the performance of each depends solely
on the traffic ratio of that particular channel. The attacker’s expectation, which is
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Figure 4.17: Attacker’s Expectation
from MBIP Mix (CDF and TPM)
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Figure 4.18: Attacker’s Expectation
from MBIP Mix (CDF and TDPM)
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Figure 4.19: Attacker’s Expectation
from MBIP Mix (CDF, TPM and TM)
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Figure 4.20: Attacker’s Expectation
from MBIP Mix (CDF and IPP)
computed according to Equation (4.13), demonstrates how far his guesswork could be
from the actual behaviour of the mix.
Figure 4.18 shows a design of MBIP Mix whereby a CDF-based selection algorithm
coexists with one based on Timed Dynamic Pool Mix (TDPM). It is observed that, due
to the lower probability of success in TDPM versus the TPM (shown in Figure 4.17),
the expectation of the attacker is further from the actual behaviour of the mix.
We have also simulated the expected behaviour of MBIP Mix where it contains
three coexisting selection algorithms: i) the normal CDF; ii) a TPM; and iii) a TDPM.
The results are shown in Figure 4.19.
Figure 4.20 shows that where at least one of the selection algorithms provides
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randomness, as provided by the IPP in this example, the attacker’s expectation is
even further from the actual behaviour of the mix.
4.6.2 Traffic Delay
Each message arriving at MBIP Mix will end up in one of the available incoming
pools. Each pool has an independent probability of success associated with its
selection algorithm (x1 . . . xn). Hence, the average number of rounds that a message
stays in MBIP Mixdepends on the probability of success of the selection algorithm
associated with the incoming pool in which a message is positioned. This may or may
not be dependent on the traffic ratio and the current size of the pool. Hence, the
average delay for each incoming channel IC1 . . . ICn can be computed as:
Average rounds of delay for ICi =
1
xi
(4.14)
The independence between the communication channels means that the low- and
high-latency communication channels could be anonymised using the same mix. This
is a unique and important property of MBIP Mix and is exemplified in Figure 4.21.
4.6.3 Blending Attack
In this section we examine the cost of the blending attack on MBIP Mix including
the number of rounds of attack, the number of messages, and the total cost for the
attacker.
Number of Rounds Required in the Emptying Phase
The number of rounds that the attacker has to flood an MBIP Mix with messages can
be computed according to:
(1− (1−
n∏
i=1
pasymi)
k)G ≥ 1− ǫ (4.15)
where G is the number of unknown messages available in the mix; n is the number of
selection algorithms operating within the MBIP Mix; 1− ǫ is the probability that the
attacker successfully flushes all the unknown messages in the mix; k is the number
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Figure 4.21: Average Message Delay in MBIP Mix
of rounds; and pasym is the asymptotic value of the selection algorithm. This can be
expressed as:
k =
ln(1− (1− ǫ)
1
G )
ln(1−
∏n
i=1 pasymi)
(4.16)
This in exemplified and contrasted with the CDF-based Binomial Mix in
Figure 4.22. The MBIP Mix shown in the figure, similar to the example used for
the MBIP Mix in Figure 4.13, contains two Binomial-based selection algorithms: i) a
CDF-based and ii) a uniformly random algorithm.
It is observable that, the number of rounds of flooding in the MBIP Mix can
increase to approximately 900 times more than that of the CDF-based Binomial Mix.
This result is approximately 12 times greater than that of the MBSP Mix as shown
in Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.22: MBIP Mix, Rounds of Blending Attack in Emptying Phase
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Figure 4.23: MBIP Mix, Total Messages in Blending Attack
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Total Cost of the Attack
The number of messages that the attacker has to send in the emptying phase can be
computed as:
Messages = NT + (k − 1)(NT +G)
n∏
i=1
pasymi (4.17)
where NT is the number of messages to forces the selection algorithms to be
equal to the corresponding asymptotic value (pasym), and n is the number of
selection algorithms in operation.
The number of rounds, k′, necessary to flood MBIP Mix in the second phase of
the attack, namely the flushing phase, can be computed according to the following
formula:
k′ =
1∏n
i=1 pasymi
(4.18)
MBIP Mix is a TM and the total number of rounds required for the attack is (k+ k′)
rounds. The total cost of the attack, in terms of the total number of messages that
the attackers must sent to the mix, can be computed as:
Messages = (NT + (k − 1)(NT +G) + (k
′NT + k
′G− 1))
n∏
i=1
pasymi (4.19)
This is exemplified in Figure 4.23 where it is shown that the attacker must flood the
mix with a significantly larger number of messages in a significantly larger number of
rounds. Given the cost of the attack, it can be concluded that a properly designed
MBIP Mix could be completely resilient toward the blending attack.
4.6.4 Requirement for Signalling Protocol
Design of MBIP Mix requires that the mix be aware of the incoming pool that an
incoming message is destined for.
The design does not enforce a theoretical limit on the number of
selection algorithms that MBIP Mix can host. In fact, our analysis shows that the
greater number of coexisting selection algorithms, the greater is the uncertainty in the
eyes of the attacker, and thus a higher degree of anonymity.
84 CHAPTER 4. MULTI-BINOMIAL MIXES
On the other hand, and as shown in Section 4.6.2, the selection algorithm
associated with each channel results in a different traffic delay. This makes the
mix capable of simultaneously anonymising network traffics with differing latency
requirements (e.g. email vs SSH communication). For the best results, this property
of MBIP Mix should be purposefully utilised.
These requirements can be met with a signalling protocol designed to set up the
configurations associated with an MBIP Mix channel. These configurations must be
set prior to the start of data transfer in the channel and should specify: i) the desired
selection algorithm (e.g. CDF or Uniform); ii) the properties associated with the
chosen algorithm (e.g. parameters of the distribution); and iii) a mechanism to link
certain incoming messages to a specific channel.
Where a communication path involves more than one MBIP Mix, the signalling
protocol needs to accommodate for a complete circuit establishment through the
network. These requirements can be achieved using the architecture and signalling
protocol provided by the Garbled Routing network (see Chapter 5).
4.7 Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter we sought to answer Research Question 2 (see Section 1.4); namely,
how can Binomial Mix be made more efficient and secure?
We proposed MBSP Mix and MBIP Mix which improve Binomial Mix in order
to achieve a less predictable behaviour. This will reduce the knowledge available to
the adversary which is the cornerstone of building various types of attacks. We have
considered the passive attack presented in Binomial Mix’s original proposal as well as
the blending attack.
MBSP Mix employs not one but multiple Binomial-based message selection
algorithms each of which has a potentially different bias function. The selection
algorithms operate one at a time and can make the mix significantly more resistant to
the passive and active attacks. The combination of bias functions used in a MBSP Mix
affects the efficiency and security achieved by the mix.
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MBIP Mix differs in that it contains isolated message pools associated with each
selection algorithm. Multiple selection algorithms may operate concurrently and thus
allow multiple channels with differing latency requirements to pass through a single
mix. The desired latency can be adjusted by the circuit establisher in the initial phase.
The resultant multi-tenancy further reduces the knowledge available to the attacker.
It also renders carrying out the blending attack impractical.
In Chapter 5 we will divert our attention to the architecture of Anonymous
Communication Systems (ACSs). Specifically, we will explain the properties of a
generic framework that will enable various mix-based ACSs to converge in a shared
system. As we shall see, this approach can achieve a higher degree of anonymity and
reduce the development efforts.

Chapter 5
A Framework for Anonymous
Communication
The best way to protect your privacy is through a
flood of misinformation obscuring the truth.
—Larry Lambert
5.1 Introduction
Chapters 3 and 4 focused on the design and evaluation of mixes in isolation. Moving
beyond that, we now turn our attention to the mixnets as a whole. The focus of this
chapter is to answer Research Question 3 of this thesis, that is, to build a generic
framework for the mix-based Anonymous Communication Systems (ACSs).
In Chapter 2, we reviewed the commonly-used and/or cited mix and mixnet designs
such as Tor, I2P, Crowds, Tarzan and Mixmaster. The variety of these designs,
which all build on the notion of Chaumian mix (see Section 2.5.5), shows that while
these systems employ many different routing and message-processing algorithms, they
nevertheless have much in common as Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems that seek similar
goals. We also reviewed various types of anonymity and saw that, presuming other
conditions are equal, global anonymity of an ACS increases as a result either of growth
in the size of the anonymity sets, or more even distribution of sending or receiving
subjects within the sets [4–7]. A unified framework for anonymous communication
can have multiple benefits, described as follows.
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Firstly, due to the variety of algorithms and design decisions in different ACSs,
implementation and testing of each system has been an independent practice because
developers need to build everything from scratch. This translates into lower reusability
in terms of, e.g. code, simulation, test and deployment. Moreover, independent
systems disperse both the research community and the end-users; the former hindering
the development and the latter opposing the cause [4, 6, 7]. Amalgamating all the
algorithms, designs, user-bases and development efforts into one generic system is
therefore an imperative need. The framework proposed in this chapter, referred to
as Garbled Routing Framework (GRF), addresses this need through leveraging the
principles of Component-based Design.
Secondly, practical ACSs (such as [26, 48, 136, 163]) while concealing the identities,
do not conceal the fact that a certain user is indeed using a particular network. This
feature, referred to as network unobservability [4], is desirable as it further complicates
traffic analysis. GRF achieves some degree of network unobservability.
Thirdly, foiling timing attacks relies on the existence of cover (dummy) traffic in
the network [93] which in turn imposes a significant overhead. Ideally, high-latency
traffic could assist with reducing the overhead by transmitting real data. Nevertheless,
the precondition is the existence of a system with the capacity for hosting various
types of traffic with different latency requirements. GRF facilitates such a mixture
by offering an environment within which components of networks with potentially
differing latencies can coexist.
Fourthly, further resistance to traffic analysis may be achieved by allowing secret
algorithms to operate in the system and, consequently, reduce the attacker’s knowledge
about the expected behaviour of the network routers. Such an amalgam of secret and
public algorithms may also introduce new vulnerabilities which need to be thoroughly
studied and analysed. Through GRF, we take a step forward in enabling the use of
secret algorithms by offering a design that supports this feature. We hope that our
work stimulates further research in this area and paves the way.
The schematic in Figure 5.1 shows a comparison of the current practice in the
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Figure 5.1: Part (A) shows three ACSs and their respective users. This is the
current model where user-bases and communication channels are distinguishable. Part
(B) shows GRF hosting multiple ACSs and therefore unifying the user-bases and
communication channels.
design of ACSs, and how GRF changes the architectural standpoint. GRF can be
thought of as an anonymous system of anonymous systems. Such an architectural
approach unifies the user-bases and decreases the ACS distinguishability, both of which
have either actual or potential positive impacts on the degree of anonymity.
There have been prior studies on providing unobservability of anonymous
communications by hiding them amongst other Internet traffic, which rely on the
cooperation of ISPs [178, 179] or popular routers [180]. We make no such assumption
here, and build solely upon the cooperation of network peers, which is an inherent
property of ACSs. We take the approach of creating an overlay convergence
architecture that aims to bring the existing and future systems together.
There have been previous attempts at blending the traffic with different latencies,
such as the Stop-and-Go-MIX [20] and Alpha-mixing [21] which offer such mixing
through time intervals in the mix nodes. Beside the additional aims of our research
as stated in the previous paragraphs, GRF accommodates such traffic mixing through
the concept of Message Processors (MPs).
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Organisation The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The following section
presents the definition of the threat model that we will use through the rest of this
chapter. Various components of GRF are detailed in Section 5.3. Strategies for
the adoption of GRF alongside the sample scenarios are presented in Section 5.4. In
Section 5.5 we discuss various aspects of security analysis, followed by the experimental
results in Section 5.6. Finally, in Section 5.7, the open questions, limitations and future
direction are discussed.
5.2 Threat Model
Inspired by the model used for the practical low-latency systems, we assume a
local attacker who is also an active attacker; that is, he can control and observe only
some fraction of the network. Specifically, the attacker can monitor the communication
to and from a user’s computer; can add and remove arbitrary messages to the
communication channels, and can run his own routers. However, the attacker is not a
global attacker: he is incapable of monitoring the entirety, and particularly the edges,
of the network. This model takes into account the fact that any ACS could eventually
be broken were the attacker able to observe the edges of the network [132].
To limit the scope of this work, we also assume that the network authorities and
the executable code running on the routers are fully trusted and free of implementation
defects. Likewise, the same assumption has been made for the components that
are downloaded through the network authorities. Finally, we also assume that the
adversary does not have a priori or contextual information about the correlation
between the incoming and the outgoing messages.
5.3 Design of Garbled Routing Framework (GRF)
The framework presented here is an overlay network that can host ACSs, referred to
as guest ACSs, in the form of plug-in components. The components of guest ACSs
are deployed through the network authorities, are publicly available and, according to
the threat model (see Section 5.2), are trusted and safe.
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Figure 5.2: Part (A) shows the users of two ACSs and their respective circuits. The
separation of networks does not allow circuits to travel inter-ACS and the routers are
thus not shared. Adoption of GRF allows the circuits to travel beyond their home
ACS as shown in Part (B).
It is also possible to deploy secret components in GRF through arbitrary sources.
However, at this stage, the secret components are considered to be only used
for experimental and research purposes. In the absence of GRF, the existing
incompatibilities amongst the ACSs prevent them from sharing routers beyond
ACS borders. A unified framework, as shown in Figure 5.2, enables inter-ACS
circuit-establishment and router-sharing, and unifies the user-bases.
Section 5.3.1 presents an overview of GRF’s major components and their roles in
relation to other parts of the system. We will then present the technical details about
the operation of each component in the subsequent sections.
5.3.1 System Architecture
The operation of GRF relies on three main parts of the systems, as shown in
Figure 5.3: namely, Garbled Routing Server (GRS), Garbled Routing Proxy (GRP)
and Garbled Routing Router (GRR). GRR is the most important part and consists
of four sub-components. Dynamic Route Processing Table (DRPT), as we shall see
in Section 5.3.2, is a data structure that allows GRR to decide on how the incoming
92 CHAPTER 5. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
GR Router
M
e
ss
a
g
e
P
T
Message 
Processors
System MP
Guest MP
Composite MP D
yn
a
m
ic
 R
o
u
te
P
T
P
ro
ce
ss
o
r
D
e
p
lo
y
 A
g
e
n
t
GR Server
D
e
p
lo
y
 A
g
e
n
t
D
ir
e
c
to
ry
GR Proxy
P
e
e
r 
D
is
c
o
v
e
ry
C
ir
c
u
it
 
E
s
ta
b
lis
h
m
e
n
t
Figure 5.3: An architectural look at GRF. The direction of dependencies among the
system components is shown by the arrows.
payloadpc seq sizeidpid
Figure 5.4: Network Message Format of GRF
messages should be dealt with. To assist this process, the network messages have a
header as shown in Figure 5.4. It is important to observe that this header serves only
to deliver the messages to the processor components. Message structures required for
the operation of guest ACSs shall be encapsulated within the payload.
A Message Processing Table (MPT) assists with keeping track of the locally
available processors. MPs, which are divided into three categories, are small processing
units that perform unique actions to the messages directed to them. The details
of MPT and MPs are presented Section 5.3.3. The Processor Deploy Agent is the
client-side component that handles the deployment of MPs on the routers.
GRP is responsible for peer-discovery and creating circuits. The complexity of
GRF mainly relies on the components of the router (GRR), and particularly on MPs
and the two processing tables (i.e. DRPT and MPT). Circuit-establishment and
peer-discovery are common practices in peer-to-peer systems which, in our system, are
provided by the guest ACS designers. The deployment process of MPs, as indicated
by the threat model (see Section 5.2), is a trusted process.
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5.3.2 Dynamic Route Processing Table (DRPT)
DRPT, as shown in Table 5.1, contains a set of Route Processing Rules (RPRs) with
a structure which resembles the rows shown in the table. If the incoming network
message is destined for a specific MP, the header fields pc and pid will identify a
unique processor. The messages that do not carry valid pc and pid values will be
checked against the active RPR entries and forwarded to the correct MPs accordingly.
Each RPR consists of a set of values and are explained as follows. Source denotes
the network address of sender of the message, and is used alongside the id and the
range specified by sequence to match a message with a specific RPR. Active time
specifies a time span during which the RPR is in effect. The time span also eliminates
the need to have sequential sequence values in the messages of a single flow, which
could potentially leak information to the adversary. The status is used during the
path-establishment process, as we shall see in Section 5.4.
The pc and pid fields in the DRPT specify how incoming messages should be
processed in case of a matching and active RPR. These values point to a unique MP
listed by MPT. The processor params contain the parameters that should be passed
to the MP alongside the incoming messages. Network routers can create RPR entries
in the DRPT of other routers, and the change secret is used to protect RPR entries
against unauthorised modification.
5.3.3 Message Processors (MPs) and Message Processing Table
(MPT)
MPs are isolated and stateful execution processes that receive messages and
perform specific tasks. The messages may be either carrying control commands or
communication data. MPs react to the messages by changing state, modifying the
messages and/or generating new messages.
MPT, as shown in Table 5.2, contains the list of locally available MPs. MPT is
maintained by Processor Deploy Agent as shown in Figure 5.3. MPs are categorised
in three main groups which are described in the following sections.
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Table 5.1: Dynamic Route Processing Table (DRPT)
Source ID Sequence Status Active Time Change Secret PC PID Processor Params
Start End Start End
RPR1 77.36.192.128 123 1 230 active 10:20 10:30 some-secret-1 SP 7 131.170.40.30
RPR2 77.36.192.128 332 231 500 active 10:20 10:40 some-secret-1 SP 7 69.147.125.65
RPR3 202.149.224.128 524 750 900 active 10:21 10:07 some-secret-2 SP 7 74.125.237.19
Table 5.2: Message Processing Table (MPT)
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PID Processor Name Description Parameters
1 Reserve RPR Reserve a RPR entry to be finalised later source|id|seqs,e|times,e
2 Finalise RPR Finalise a reserved RPR entry and set its processors source|id|seqs,e|times,e|secret|pid|params
3 Delete RPR Delete RPR by its creator source|id|seqs,e|times,e|secret
4 Create Composite Create mix of existing processors pid1|param1|pid2|param2 . . .
5 Add Public Install public guest processor pid
6 Add Secret Install secret guest processor Unified Resource Locator (URL)
7 Relay Message Forwarding messages as is IP
8 Encrypt Message Encrypt message algorithm|key
9 Decrypt Message Decrypt message algorithm|key
10 Change Header Alter the header values of message pc|pid|id|seq|size
Public Guest Processors
Available for everyone; algorithm is publicly known; downloaded from the network authority
Secret Guest Processors
Secret algorithms; downloaded via arbitrary URLs or other out-of-band means
Composite Processors
Created by the PID=4 System Processor; in-memory and short-lived
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System Message Processors
The basic and essential services of GRF are offered by this type of MP and exist on
every GRR. A network message having a pc value of System and a valid value for pid
will be delivered to the specified System MP. Alternatively, an RPR in DRPT may
direct a message with a particular id and sequence to a specific System MP.
The first three System MPs allow the modification of DRPT. They respectively
offer the functionality to reserve, finalise and delete RPR entries on a remote router.
The change secret may be locally generated by router or specified by a remote router.
The Create Composite MPs create a dynamic composition of the existing
processors on a router. This is an important element of the design and will be further
explained in the following sections. Composite MPs depend on the existence of a set
of processors that allow being mixed with others. The Add Public and Add Secret
MPs are responsible to deploy the two types of Guest MPs on a router.
A Relay Message MP is responsible for relaying the messages to other network
nodes. Basic ciphering and deciphering techniques may be implemented in the form
of Encrypt Message and Decrypt Message MPs. These basic methods may be extended
by Guest MPs. The Change Header MP alters the header values of a network message
while it travels through routers.
Guest Message Processors
As opposed to System MPs that form the basis of GRF, the existence of Guest MPs
is not obligatory. However, any extension to the basic functionality of GRF, including
integration with guest ACSs, is implemented by the Guest MPs. Figure 5.5 shows an
instance where a communication path is going through three routers < a, b, c >, with
each GRR performing some operations on the messages.
The Public Guest MPs are made available through the trusted network authorities.
These Processors are open-source and available to the general public, which is the
property of most existing and reputable ACSs [26, 163, 181, 182].
Secret MPs differ in that they are not necessarily well-known and open-source but
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Figure 5.5: Guest MPs inside GRRs. Here GRR b contains a Composite MP
encompassing four MPs, namely, the α, β, γ, and δ.
rather can be anything made available via an arbitrary source. This type of MP,
which is currently only an experimental part of GRF, serves two purposes. Firstly, it
allows GRF to accommodate the integration of guest ACSs which operate using secret
algorithms. As a result, the user-bases of all ACSs will grow and uncertainty about the
behaviour of routers will increase. Secondly, this type of MP accelerates the process of
testing the developing algorithms by allowing designers to conduct experiments using
an operational and large network.
Various security aspects of hosting secret algorithms within GRF are discussed in
this chapter. Specifically, from the attacker’s point of view, the additional uncertainty
that these algorithms bring to the operation of routers is analysed in Sections 5.5.2
and 5.5.4; and the new types of vulnerabilities introduced by this technique and the
corresponding remedies are discussed in Section 5.5.1. As this feature is introduced
in GRF for the first time, it is necessary to invite more critical analyses from the
community. Meanwhile, we rely on this feature only as an experimental one.
Composite Message Processors
This type of MP is created in-memory and only as a result of other remote nodes
invoking the Create Composite MP. pid is specified during the creation phase, using
a random generator algorithm, and returned to the remote creator. Composite MPs,
as opposed to other MP types, are not permanent and will be automatically deleted
when no longer in use. The flexibility offered by GRF mainly relies on the Composite
MPs for they allow virtually any message processing algorithm to be hosted by GRF.
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The existing ACSs can integrate with GRF and become guest ACSs in either of
two ways. The first is to write a single and complex Guest MP which contains the
entirety of the logic necessary for the operation of a router in the ACS in question.
Though seemingly more convenient, this approach is discouraged as it is not aligned
with the goals of GRF.
Alternatively, various features of the guest ACS and all the required logic for
processing network messages in that ACS can be broken down and implemented as a
set of small and simple MPs. These small MPs can then be combined into complex
processing units using the Composite MPs. This second approach is encouraged
because the frequently-used message processing techniques (e.g. encryption and
integrity checking) would then have a higher chance of being shared and reused.
Here we present a simple example for using Composite MPs. Assume node NA
wants to reserve an RPR entry on node NC without a direct communication with
NC . NA would need to first create a Composite MP on an intermediary node NB
such that it would be a combination of Change Header and Relay Message MPs. In
this example, the new pid of the message would be equal to 1 (i.e. to reserve a path),
and relay destination would be NC . NA then could create an RPR on NB and set
its processor to the newly-created Composite MP. Having done that, NA could then
send a message to NB’s newly-created Composite MP, causing NB to change the pid
of the message to 1 and relay it to NC .
5.3.4 Internal Message Flow of the Routers
In order to bring together the concepts mentioned in the previous sections, a schematic
of various processor categories and their interactions is shown is Figure 5.6. Direction
of the arrows shows the flow direction. Message Dispatcher resorts to DRPT and
MPT to decide which processor is responsible to process a certain message. Only
system MPs are allowed to access the system services, whereas the other types of MPs
can only access the system services through creating new messages destined for the
corresponding system MPs. Algorithm 1 shows the logic of message dispatching.
98 CHAPTER 5. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
Public Guest Message Processors
Secret Guest Message Processors
Composite Message Processors
Message 
Dispatcher
System Message Processors
DRPT MPT
Other 
System 
Components
Figure 5.6: Internal Message Flow of GRRs. Message Dispatcher receives network
messages and routes them to the processors as per the existing rules in DRPT and
MPT. Processing the messages may result in the creation of new messages which, in
turn, will be returned to Message Dispatcher. Accessing and altering DRPT, MPT,
and other system resources as well as sending messages to other network nodes are all
available only through the System MPs.
Algorithm 1 Message Dispatching inside the Framework Routers
1: sender, msg ← AwaitMessage()
2: processor, params ← empty
3: processor ← FindProcessor(msg.pc, msg.pid)
4: if processor 6= ‘valid processor’ then
5: processor, param ← FindInDRPT(sender, msg.id, msg.seq)
6: end if
7: if processor = ‘valid processor’ then
8: ProcessMessage(processor, params, msg)
9: else
10: DropMessage(msg)
11: end if
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5.3.5 Garbled Routing Server (GRS)
GRS is the network authority that offers two services. Firstly, GRS acts as the network
directory assisting with the peer-discovery procedure. Secondly, it serves as a trusted
source for distribution of System and Public Guest MPs; that is, it stores the list and
the executable components of such MPs.
As mentioned in the description of the architecture (see Section 5.3.1) and aligned
with the threat model (see Section 5.2), GRS constitutes a trusted authority and
distributes only trusted code. Hence, this chapter does not include a security analysis
with the aim of evaluating the resilience of GRS against attacks. Here, attention is
paid to the services provided by GRS that assist with the experimentation of GRF.
5.4 Modelling the Operation of Guest ACSs
The technical details of GRF were presented in the previous section. The aim of this
section is to put the presented details into context and to describe how GRF can be
put into practice. To this end, we first explain how GRF can be adopted in various
guest ACSs with differing requirements. Afterwards, we present three examples. The
first example is a simplified look at the adoption requirements, whereas the second
and third examples focus on modelling two real-world ACSs.
5.4.1 Adoption of the Framework
When it comes to sharing the user-bases, various ACS designs have different
requirements and limitations. For instance, some ACSs may want to share their
user-bases only partially in an attempt to hide the network topology or to prevent
the attacker from enumerating and thus attacking all the participating routers.
Adoption of GRF can be gradually implemented in various guest ACSs according
to the requirements and design strategies.
Figure 5.7 shows three structurally different ACSs where A and B allow nodes
to communicate with external entities (i.e. E1 and E2), and C is an example of a
storage and retrieval system sharing data only within the system boundaries. Four
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Figure 5.7: Different ACSs may expose the entirety of their nodes (e.g. Network
A) or do so partially (e.g. Networks B and C). This allows a controlled sharing of
user-bases and conceals the topology of networks as desired. GRS can be used as
the network directory. The grey nodes represent GRRs; that is, nodes that adopted
GRF’s protocol.
sample communication paths are shown, namely Ah ↔ E1, Aa ↔ E2, Bb ↔ E2, and
Cf ↔ Cb. The lower half of Figure 5.7 shows the same ACSs after the adoption of
GRF; that is, these ACSs have become guest ACSs of GRF. The nodes shown in grey
represent GRRs. As shown, an ACS can expose its entire set of routers or choose to
share only a limited portion.
GRF allows the communication paths in the guest ACSs to go beyond the
traditional network boundaries. For instance, the communication path Aa ↔ E2
is changed from < Aa, Ab, Ac, E2 > to use also the nodes in the ACS B and become
< Aa, Ab, Bf , E2 >. Similarly, the path Bb ↔ E2 is also changed to use nodes in ACS
C to become < Bb, Bc, Cf , E2 >.
Routers operating inside GRF (i.e. GRRs) cannot know to which guest ACS other
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Figure 5.8: GRF shown as an extra communication layer, allowing the unification
of multiple guest ACSs. The guest ACSs benefit from joining GRF whether fully or
partially.
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Figure 5.9: Sample Echo Circuit through GRF. Here GRP creates a circuit through
three routers (GRRs) in order to send messages through this circuit that will be echoed
back to its source.
routers truly belong, and GRRs’ knowledge is limited to whether or not other GRRs
are able to route messages for them. Figure 5.8 shows how GRF operates as an
extension to the existing communication layers.
5.4.2 The Echo Circuit Example
An echo circuit is a very simple circuit that returns messages to the sender after they
have travelled through a number of intermediary nodes. We assume an external entity
GRP wants to establish an echo circuit through GRF. As shown in Figure 5.9, the
path goes through the two routers, GRR1 and GRR2, and is then echoed back by a
final router GRR3 to its source.
Algorithm 2 shows a simple sequence of messages that GRP should send to the
participating GRRs. In the first step the message is destined for GRR1 which is
instructed to relay messages received from GRP, with an assumed id = 12, to GRR2.
The rest of the routers are similarly instructed to forward the messages without any
further processing. If all routers return success results, in Steps 8–10, GRP sends
another round of messages to all routers for finalising the circuit creation. If the
returned results indicate failure, GRP would have to try to address the problem and
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retry the circuit creation.
Algorithm 2 Echo Circuit Establishment by a Proxy (GRP)
1: Send(GRR1, pc:sp, pid:1, param[id:12, src:GRP, pid:7, dst:GRR2])
2: Send(GRR2, pc:sp, pid:1, param[id:12, src:GRR1, pid:7, dst:GRR3])
3: Send(GRR3, pc:sp, pid:1, param[id:12, src:GRR2, pid:7, dst:GRR2])
4: Send(GRR2, pc:sp, pid:1, param[id:12, src:GRR3, pid:7, dst:GRR1])
5: Send(GRR1, pc:sp, pid:1, param[id:12, src:GRR2, pid:7, dst:GRP])
6: results ← AwaitReply(timeout, GRR1, GRR2, GRR3)
7: if results = ‘path succeeded’ then
8: for all GRRi in path do
9: Send(GRRi, pc:sp, pid:2, param[finalise RPR params])
10: end for
11: else
12: retry with different settings (e.g. id← id+ 1)
13: end if
Existence of reserved RPRs allows having an abstract path negotiation state such
that the logic of GRF is made independent of the logic of the guest ACSs. This makes
the circuit-establishment process very flexible by allowing the negotiations to hide
behind the reserved RPRs.
5.4.3 Tor-Like Circuit Establishment in the Framework
As a real-world and low-latency guest ACS modelling, we adopted the
circuit-establishment in Tor, which is shown in Figure 5.10. Alice, who wants to browse
a website through two intermediary routers, needs to create the communication path
one hop at a time. In the first phase, she negotiates a symmetric key with GRR1 by
sending a create request, and then asks GRR1 to extend the path to GRR2.
The message exchange required to reproduce this phase is shown in part (a) of
Figure 5.10. The negotiatorn is an MP that wraps the logic of Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, and TorExtender represents another MP that wraps the logic of extending
a Tor-like path to the next hop.
In the second phase, Alice sends the data transmission request to GRR1, which is
wrapped in multiple layers of encryption. GRR1 unwraps one encryption layer and
passes the resulting message to GRR2. The final layer of encryption is removed by
GRR2 and the actual request is sent to the final destination. The responses received
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Figure 5.10: Tor-like Circuit Establishment through GRF. The original form of this
model was presented in [26] and is extended here to show how a real-world ACS
becomes a guest ACS in GRF.
from the website are sent through the path back to Alice. This phase is shown in part
(b) of Figure 5.10.
5.4.4 Modelling Mixmaster in the Framework
Mixmaster [182] is a high-latency communication protocol that protects email
messages against traffic analysis. In this section, we model the operation of this
protocol as another real-world ACS example which can operate within GRF.
The relay nodes of the Mixmaster protocol are known as remailers. When Alice
wants to send an anonymous email to Bob, her user-agent performs a number of tasks:
compressing the message; splitting it into smaller pieces; building one independent
circuit for each message piece through the ACS; encrypting each piece multiple times
with public-key of relay nodes, and finally sending each piece to the first relay in the
corresponding circuit. A simplified version of this process in GRF has been shown in
Algorithm 3.
104 CHAPTER 5. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
Algorithm 3 Mixmaster User Agent in GRF
1: receiver, message ← AwaitMessage()
2: compressedMessage ← CompressMessage(message)
3: messagePieces[] ← BreakIntoPieces(compressedMessage)
4: GRRfinal ← ChooseFinalRelay()
5: Create Mixmaster final remailer composite on GRRfinal to relay to receiver
6: for all messagePiecei in messagePieces[] do
7: GRRListi ← SelectRandomRelays(GRRfinal)
8: for all GRRz ← GRRListi do
9: Create Mixmaster remailer composite on GRRz to end to GRRfinal
10: end for
11: Send messagePiecei to first router in GRRListi
12: end for
The remailers, which may be implemented within GRF, perform a number of tasks
shown in Figure 5.11. All the remailers along the way, except the final one, perform
the following tasks: decrypting the received messages with their private key; integrity
checking; decrypting the message using the embedded secret-key; shifting bytes up
to update the header; appending random bytes to maintain a constant message size;
adding random dummy messages; putting the outgoing messages into a message pool,
and finally relaying the message to the next remailer.
As shown in Figure 5.11, these tasks may be performed by a set of MPs. It is
important to note that, in accordance with the aim of providing reusability in GRF,
multiples of the suggested MPs may be developed in a generic fashion and thus be
shared amongst various guest ACSs.
The final remailer is responsible for merging the pieces of the message and
forwarding it to the final destination. It is also responsible for identifying and
discarding duplicated messages, decompressing the message after reconstruction, and
maintaining a message pool similar to that of the intermediary remailers. These steps
are expressed in Figure 5.11 as per GRF’s MP design.
5.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we elaborate on the security aspects of GRF. The risks involved in
deploying the MP components are discussed first. The topics that will follow are
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Figure 5.11: Mixmaster Remailers Algorithm in GRF. The two types of remailer are
broken down to their potential MPs. The processors shown with italicised names are
generic and can be shared amongst various guest ACSs.
mainly concerned with the ability of the attacker to predict GRF’s states. This section
also discusses the features of GRF that, if considered in the design of future ACSs,
will have a positive impact on the security of those designs starting from the very
early stages of their operation.
5.5.1 Susceptibility to Malicious Code
The term malicious code is used to refer to any MP deployed in GRF that either
compromises the anonymity of users or disrupts the normal activity of GRF. As
specified by the threat model (see Section 5.2), the software packages offering the
core functionality of GRF are fully trusted. Therefore, malicious code refers only to
the code that is deployed through the Guest MPs.
The Public MPs are deployed through the network authority, and thus only a
compromised authority would allow the distribution of such malicious MPs. This
issue could be avoided through voting and signing techniques used by the network
authorities which, according to the threat model, is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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The Secret Guest MPs can be deployed via arbitrary sources. It is important
to observe that the execution of this type of processors depends on the existence of
corresponding DRPT entries. Naturally, honest nodes never instruct other peers to
invoke malicious components in their communication paths. However, this may change
if the path goes through nodes controlled or subverted by the attacker.
Trusting the truthful execution of the protocol is a common challenge in the design
of ACSs, which deteriorates by relying on volunteer network participants. Verifiable
Mixes eliminate this problem but they are yet to be made efficient for low-latency
communication [132]. The widely-accepted countermeasure is to create paths with
geopolitically distant nodes, which significantly narrows the odds of them all being
controlled by the same adversary. This guarantees some level of anonymity, even if
the messages travel through malicious routers.
The attacker may also remotely create DRPT entries to invoke malicious
components that do not intercept a channel but otherwise disrupt the network. This
applies only where GRF routers (GRRs) allow the execution of Secret Guest MPs,
and can be contained by effective sandboxing and resource management techniques
within GRRs. Specifically, MPs must be allowed limited computation and memory
resources, and be isolated from other MPs and system resources. This can be achieved,
for instance, via the sandboxing and access control techniques that Java offers.
5.5.2 Information about the Expected Behaviour of Routers
Inspired by previous work [21], here we elaborate on attacker’s knowledge about
the expected behaviour of the system. The traditional ACS routers have a fairly
predictable behaviour although it is somewhat obfuscated by embedding random
elements in their design. For instance, nodes in Crowds [48] flip a biased coin to
determine whether they should forward packets to another node. Although this
increases uncertainty, the attacker is still able to benefit from the probability of
possible behaviours.
GRRs must be able to disable Secret MPs if they so wish. Hence, at any given
time, from the total number of routers R, a portion run only Public MPs (Rp) and
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the other routers allow both Public and Secret MPs (Rp,s), where R = Rp +Rp,s.
The total number of MPs deployed in GRF is denoted by A, which includes Ap
number of Public and As Secret MPs, where A = Ap + As. The probability that
a certain router runs a particular MP α and, consequently, behaves expectedly is
calculated as:
Pα = Pr(GRR running MP α) (5.1)
= Pr(GRR running a specific composition)
= Pr(GRR being only a relay)
= Pr(MP-based attacks match the right GRR)
=
Rp
RAp
+
Rp,s
RA
This equation also includes terms about the probability of a GRR being only a
relay, running a specific composition, and being targeted by the right algorithm-based
attack. Note that the extra cases mentioned here are in fact different expressions of
the same problem. In other words, being only a relay is one instance of α; targeting
an attack to the right MP is searching for a particular instance of α; and running a
specific composition is yet another instance of α.
As an example, assume a scenario where no router allows Secret MPs, no Public
MP has any built-in randomness, and only two Guest MPs exist in GRF. Although the
assumptions are overly strict, yet there is significant decrease in an attacker’s certainty
about the value of Pα. These assumptions are somewhat relaxed in Figure 5.12 where
it is assumed that 10% of GRRs allow Secret MPs. Furthermore, observe that the
number of Secret MPs (i.e. As) is in fact unknown, and hence the attacker cannot
compute the value of Pα with absolute certainty.
5.5.3 Probability of Successful Attacks
We define Tα to be an attack on MPα, with some probability of success Pr(TαS ).
In the previous section it was shown that for an attack to succeed, it must first be
matched to the right MP. We denote the probability of success of any given attack,
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Figure 5.13: Probability of attack
succeeding when ACSs migrate to GRF
(Pr(TαS′)).
after the targeted MPα becomes a guest in GRF, as Pr(T
′
αS ), and calculate it as:
Pr(T ′αS ) = Pr(TαS )· Pα (5.2)
This is shown in Figure 5.13, where the worst case is when attack Tα is successful
every time and the MPα is identifiable with absolute certainty. Given the value of Pα
as shown in (5.1), it can be seen that as the total number of MPs in GRF grows, the
probability of success of the attack decreases, i.e. limA→∞ Pr(T
′
αS ) = 0.
It is interesting to observe that the probability of n nodes being involved in
the same communication path in GRF, denoted by Pr(S ′n), can be calculated as
shown in (5.3). N is the total number of guest ACSs within GRF, and Pr(Sni) is
the probability of n nodes being involved in the same communication path in the
guest ACSi, irrespective of GRF.
Pr(S ′n) =
N∏
i=1
Pr(Sni) (5.3)
Equation (5.3) shows a relative decrease in the attacker’s certainty about the total
number of nodes typically involved in a circuit. Consequently, the attacker also knows
less about the potential position of a GRR in the circuits.
In the traditional ACS design, the behaviour of a group of n consecutive routers
is fairly likely to be known to the attacker. In contrast, in GRF the probability of a
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path of n nodes running any certain MP or composition of MPs is:
Pr(n nodes run algorithm α) (5.4)
= Pr(n nodes run a certain composition)
= Pα
n
This shows a significant decrease in the attacker’s certainty about the behaviour of
the routers. Similar to (5.2), in (5.4) we can observe that limA→∞ Pα
n = 0.
5.5.4 Elements of Obscurity
The attacker’s elementary step is to gather information about the network operation
and the expected behaviour of the nodes. For instance, to launch a tagging attack
(see Section 2.5.5), the attacker must first ensure that cryptographic techniques used
in the system are indeed vulnerable to a certain type of tagging attack. Although the
operation of GRF is publicly known, GRF still introduces additional obscurity to the
operation of ACSs as explained below.
Hidden Secret MPs Secret MPs, as presented in Section 5.3.3, can be deployed in
GRF through an arbitrary source. This feature is currently experimental and subject
to further study. It is important to note that if the source of deployment is public
knowledge (e.g. through a publicly accessible URL), the MP is in fact no longer a
secret entity.
Although the MPs made available through publicly accessible sources no longer
constitute secret, they have other applications for the community. This feature enables
the deployment of MPs which are yet to be approved by the network authorities for
the purpose of wide distribution and use. Such a capability is useful for the phases
in which MPs are being developed and tested because it can offer the development
team an opportunity to test the effectiveness and performance of their anonymisation
algorithm inside a real system.
It is important to highlight that these MPs, although not effectively secret, are
deployed in the network through methods unknown to the adversary. Hence, to ensure
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a particular router supports such MPs, the attacker must undergo the task of probing
that individual router for its available services.
If the Guest MPs are distributed through genuinely secret means, then both the
logic and the expected behaviour of those MPs are concealed from the attacker. This
is also true about the pattern of distribution of those MPs in the network. These
are indeed secret MPs that limit the knowledge that the attacker can possibly have
about the behaviour of GRF and its routers. This also provides for the existence of
GRRs that serve other peers by offering the services of the System and Public MPs,
while their own communications are in fact transmitted through Secret MPs and the
associated secret ACS.
Furthermore, the existence of the Secret MPs limits the attacker’s ability
to position his routers within arbitrary guest ACSs. It is safe to assume
that a secretly-operating guest ACS has out-of-band means of peer-discovery and
component-distribution, as well as obscured means of node-selection.
Active Processors At any given time, it is not obvious whether a specific single or
composite MP is in operation within a certain channel on a GRR. This is known only
to the circuit establisher and owner of the router. According to the threat model (see
Section 5.2), the attacker has only a partial view of the network. Besides, due to the
geographical distribution of nodes, even if the communication path travels through
certain GRRs controlled by the attacker, he will still not be able to gain information
about the MPs that are active on other GRRs involved in the path.
5.5.5 Composite Processors
In GRF, composition of MPs is dynamic and at the request of other nodes. Harvesting
the full capacity of this feature needs a careful design of guest ACSs and, in particular,
a fine break-down in the design of their Guest MPs. This is shown in Figure 5.14 where
three permutations of Guest MPs are illustrated.
In permutation (a), which resembles a conventional network, the behaviour of
GRRs are fixed and therefore predictable. In permutation (b) the same order of MPs
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(a)
(b)
(c)
✁ ✂   ✁ ✂  
✄ ☎ ✆ ✄ ☎ ✆
✝ ✞ ✟✞ ✟ ✝
Figure 5.14: Three Possible Permutations of Composite MPs
is distributed among three GRRs, and consequently certainty about the behaviour
of the GRRs is decreased. Permutation (c) is the most flexible design where neither
the distribution nor the order of MPs is a constraint, and thus the behaviour of the
routers is least predictable.
Nevertheless, design and implementation barriers may not allow such perfection.
The theoretical limit λ on the possible number of permutations for an ACS with n
Guest MPs is calculated according to Equation (5.5).
λ = n! +
n−1∑
i=0
n!
(n− i)!
(5.5)
Note that n solely counts the Guest MPs that can actually be freely distributed
among network nodes in any order. A well-balanced distribution of permutations
yields a lower chance that attackers can infer the type of ACS in use by analysing the
behaviour of the composite MPs.
5.5.6 Predicting the State of the Routers
An active GRR, i.e. a router that sends and receives traffic, can be in a limited number
of states listed below. Here the total number of guest ACSs is N , where N ≥ C +R;
C ≥ 0, and R ≥ 0.

1) Communicating through C guest ACSs;
2) relaying traffic of R guest ACSs; or
3) both 1 and 2.
Inferring through which guest ACSs a node is sending and receiving data requires
computing the probabilities of these states. The attacker cannot gain enough
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knowledge about the distribution of guest ACSs in GRF, and hence is not able to
compute the probabilities. This is because GRF unifies and blends the packet structure
of all its guest ACSs. Consequently, even if the attackers can monitor the traffic of a
certain GRR, he can infer only that the router is connected to GRF but will not be
able to identify the guest ACSs to which the router is connected.
In the ideal state, the probability of a GRR being connected to a specific ACSG
is 1
N
. The attacker may be able to gain knowledge by analysing other traffic
properties such as timing and volume. Uncertainty exists only when traffic patterns
are indistinguishable. We use EG to denote the total number of guest ACSs with traffic
properties similar to ACSG , and assume that they are equally likely, i.e. Pr(G) =
1
EG
.
Knowledge of attackers about the states of active GRRs can be modelled as shown in
be following distribution:
Distribution =
{
C∏
i=1
1
Ei
,
R∏
i=1
1
Ei
,
C∏
i=1
1
Ei
×
R∏
i=1
1
Ei
}
(5.6)
The total number of ACSs with similar traffic patterns, i.e. Ei, includes both the
Public and Secret MPs, whereas the degree of similarity with the Secret MPs remains
unknown. This is because there are no means to count and compare the Secret MPs
unless an attacker can compromise all GRRs. The attacker can thus not have sufficient
knowledge about the correct distribution of MPs with similar patterns (i.e. EG and
Ei).
Distribution (5.6) also implies that an increase in the number of guest ACSs, and
particularly an increase in similarity of the traffic patterns of various guest ACSs,
yields a lower chance of inferring the type of ACSs in use. The ideal would be to have
similar traffic patterns for all guest ACSs (i.e. EG = N ). In other words, this means
that more reusability of Guest and Composite MPs leads to more uncertainty for the
attacker. Hence, it is to the benefit of all guest ACSs to join GRF, to make the traffic
patterns as similar to other guest ACSs as possible, and to reuse the existing MPs.
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5.6 Experimental Results
This section presents the results obtained from conducting experiments using an actual
implementation of GRF. The implementation language is JAVA, and the experiments
are conducted using machines with Intel Core 2 Due 2.66 GHz processor, 2 GB physical
memory, and Microsoft Windows 7 operating system.
GRF network messages are 512 bytes, which consist of 8 bytes of header and 504
bytes of payload. This does not include the standard packet headers (e.g. TCP and
IP). The LAN network of our lab is set up in a star network topology, and the network
round-trip delay between any two machines is approximately equal to 1 millisecond.
The round-trip delay of the loopback device used in the experiments is less than 1
millisecond. The indicated delays have a trivial impact on our results and are thus
disregarded.
GRF builds on the notion of Guest MPs and takes the approach of a modular
system that can be extended by additional modules. Ideally, guest ACSs will break
their functionality down into a set of finely grained MPs, so that they can be reused
in the paths built by other guest ACSs. As almost any nontrivial message processing
involves creating Composite MPs, we paid particular attention to testing Composite
MPs. To this end, the tests include building communication paths employing various
numbers of MPs within each Composite MP inside GRR.
Figure 5.15 shows the average delay caused by creating composite processors based
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on the number of components employed in each composite. The results of a similar
experiment are shown in Figure 5.16 where the path establisher used a loopback
address to create composites on a local router.
The comparison of the two result sets is presented in Figure 5.17, which shows that
creating more complex composite MPs on a local router results in relatively greater
delays. These delays are the result of management and sharing of resources which are
required to be performed by the operating system of the host machine. Breaking down
the delay caused by the existence of each extra MP in a Composite MP is challenging
due to the notable communication and JVM overheads. To minimise the overheads, we
conducted the experiment with a very large number of MPs (up to 160 in a Composite
MP), and present the results in Figure 5.18. Under the conditions of our lab, adding
each new processor to the Composite MP adds roughly 9.5 milliseconds to the initial
path establishment process.
The experiments are extended by first creating unidirectional paths, and then by
creating complete bidirectional circuits that start from Alice, go through n GRRs,
reach Bob in the middle, and return through n other GRRs to Alice. Figures 5.19 and
5.20 show the delays in creating the paths and transferring messages through them.
The times necessary for Alice to create each circuit, as well as the round-trip time
of the data packet, are shown in Figure 5.21. Finally, we measured the transfer time of
six real files over the established circuits, as shown in Figure 5.22. The reported times
are calculated from the moment Alice sends the message carrying the first portion of
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Figure 5.22: File Transfer Rates
the file to the moment Bob receives the last portion.
The conducted experiments show that the implementation of GRF is feasible. It
also shows that so long as MPs do not impose excessive delays to the communication
paths, the overheads on the data transmission is not significant. We also showed the
average delay that is caused by each additional MP in a path. The limitations of our
work and future directions will be discussed next.
5.7 Limitations and Future Directions
Design of ACSs involves consideration of many requirements and demands thorough
analysis. The framework proposed in this chapter is the first attempt aimed at bringing
together various ACSs. The next steps for strengthening the design of GRF are as
follows.
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Making the Framework Resilient towards Various Attacks The features of
GRF which were presented in this chapter focus on making GRF as generic as possible
so that it can allow as many guest ACSs to join its platform as possible. Special
attention needs be paid to the various types of attacks that may disrupt not the
operation of the guest ACSs but that of GRF. This requirement must be highlighted
by referring to the fact that exploiting the vulnerabilities of GRF will negatively
impact not on just one ACS but perhaps all the guest ACSs. In the next chapter, we
focus on certain weaknesses of GRF towards the Denial-of-Service attacks, and note
that further analysis to identify and address the potential vulnerabilities of GRF is
required.
Further Implementation and Analysis We used an experimental
implementation and simple Guest MPs to conduct our tests and analysis.
Implementation of a sufficiently generic framework is a challenging and
time-consuming undertaking. This chapter focuses on the functionalities provided by
the framework and measures its feasibility. In order to build a full-fledged architecture,
more research, development, and analysis are required. It is of particular importance
to integrate the existing ACSs into GRF, which would allow improving the design of
GRF to better match the requirement of real-world systems.
Network Authority Design In a generic framework, issues such as bootstrapping,
peer-discovery, trust management, scalability, and network authority’s resistance to
different attacks, demand special attention. There are many requirements and models
to be addressed which are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Large-scale Scalability Analysis Real-life analysis of a global peer-to-peer
network can be best conducted with deployments with similar settings. Our analysis is
based on the limited resources at our disposal, and this area demands future attention.
Malicious Secret Processors Employing Secret MPs in an ACS is a new approach
that introduces more uncertainty about the behaviour of the network. In this chapter,
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we discussed the potential advantages, threats and counter measures. Nevertheless, at
this stage we believe this feature should only be used only for experimental purposes.
Further analysis and testing is required before being used in ACSs.
Coexistence of Different Latency Traffics GRF allows the mixture of different
latency traffics, while finding the most efficient setting for mixing these traffics
demands further work. This issue is closely linked to the need for dummy traffic
in some guest ACSs, and reconciling them in a meaningful and efficient way is an
interesting area of future work.
5.8 Summary of the Chapter
In order to answer Research Question 3 of this thesis, we have proposed a generic
framework which we named Garbled Routing Framework (GRF).
GRF is a new peer-to-peer overlay network architecture that can host the building
blocks of ACSs and thus allow various ACSs to converge. Message Processor (MP)
components, and their compositions which can be dynamically deployed on GRRs,
are core to hosting various message processing logics in GRF. Dynamic routing
mechanisms allow a simple, effective and customisable circuit-establishment process.
A unified framework enables sharing the volunteer routers beyond the traditional
boundaries of ACSs, and thus grows the user-bases of all the ACSs that choose to
become guests within GRF. It also enables code-base sharing that facilitates and
accelerates the research and development. GRF enables the coexistence of Public and
Secret MPs in a shared infrastructure which can potentially lead to a whole new trend
in the design of ACSs.
In addition to the technical details, this chapter presents how GRF should be
adopted by the guest ACSs. Routers of GRF offer a significantly less predictable
behaviour, and therefore a relatively higher resistance to the attacks. Feasibility
of the design is tested through a Java implementation which is used for various
circuit establishment and data transmission scenarios. This chapter also discussed
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the existing challenges and limitations that must be tackled in order to harvest the
great potentials of GRF.
Chapter 6
DoS Resistant Circuit
Establishment Facility
Every man should know that his conversations, his
correspondence, and his personal life are private.
—Lyndon B. Johnson
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we presented our work towards creating a generic framework
for anonymous communication. The proposed framework, referred to as Garbled
Routing Framework (GRF), enables Anonymous Communication Systems (ACSs) to
be hosted in a shared platform. As discussed in Section 5.7, the design of a sufficiently
generic and robust system is a major undertaking and many dimensions of such a
system require extensive analysis and development.
This chapter covers Research Question 4 of this thesis which aims to improve the
reliability in one aspect of GRF; that is, securing the circuit establishment facility of
the GRF against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
In GRF, routers maintain a collection of data elements referred to as Dynamic
Route Processing Table (DRPT). This is used by the routers to associate the incoming
messages with the respective Message Processors (MPs) they are destined for. DRPT
consists of a set of entries referred to as Route Processing Rule (RPR).
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Table 6.1: Sample of Dynamic Route Processing Table (DRPT)
Source ID Sequence Status Active Time Change Secret PC PID Processor Params
Start End Start End
77.36.192.128 123 1 230 active 10:20 10:30 some-secret-1 SP 7 131.170.40.30
77.36.192.128 332 231 500 active 10:20 10:40 some-secret-1 SP 7 69.147.125.65
202.149.224.128 524 750 900 reserved 10:21 10:07 some-secret-2 SP 7 74.125.237.19
202.149.224.128 221 ∗ ∗ active ∗ ∗ some-secret-2 SP 7 74.125.237.20
As shown in Table 6.1, each RPR is essentially a filter for the incoming messages
as well as a pointer to a set of instructions (i.e. MPs) indicating how the matching
messages must be processed. The RPRs are created on a router as per the requests of
other nodes in the network, which takes place during the circuit establishment process
whereby a node creates a desired path through the available routers.
In the design of GRF which was presented in the previous chapter, requests for
the creation of RPR entries can be sent by any node in the network and without any
limitations. This allows malicious nodes to launch DoS attacks by sending too many
requests for new RPRs and thus exhausting all available resources of the routers.
A sufficiently large number of requests sent by an attacker imposes a significant
processing load as well as memory overhead on the receiving router. The abuse of
processing power can cause a significant delay in the affected router’s response time.
The overconsumption of memory can consume the entirety of physical memory on
a router and eventually kill that node. In this chapter the vulnerabilities of the
circuit establishment facility of GRF to certain DoS attacks are identified, and counter
measure techniques are proposed and evaluated to eliminate these threats.
Organisation The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents
the details of the identified DoS attacks and their impact on the functionality of
GRF. The countermeasure techniques are presented in Sections 6.3–6.5, which are
analysed through mathematical modelling. The proposed techniques make GRF
resilient against the identified attacks.
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6.2 DoS Attacks on Circuit Establishment Facility
The ability of Garbled Routing Routers (GRRs) to create new RPRs, which is
exercised on the basis of the requests received from remote routers, can be exploited by
attackers to launch DoS attacks on the circuit establishment facility. A malicious node
can send a large number of requests for creation of RPRs1 to other nodes in GRF,
causing them to run out of either non-colliding RPR entries or available Random
Access Memory (RAM). Consequently, the attacked routers will no longer be able to
provide service to the requests of non-malicious network members.
The packet size used in the experimental implementation of GRF is 512 bytes (see
Section 5.6 for the details of the experiments) which consists of 8 bytes of header and
504 bytes of payload. If we assume that the creation of each RPR entry involves the
transmission of only two network messages (i.e. request and response), then only one
message (i.e. the request) can be used to carry all the necessary parameters to set up
a new RPR entry.
With the current packet size, this leads to the size of each RPR being ≤ 504 bytes.
Hence, in order to occupy 1 MB of RAM on a router, an attacker must remotely build
more than 2000 RPR entries on that router. Consequently, she needs to exchange
more than 4000 messages with the node, which may be understood as the amount of
load imposed on the attacker.
The amount of occupied RAM on the routers, based on the number of exchanged
messages, can be computed according to Equation (6.1). Here, rn is the total number
of messages the attacker exchanges, mn is the minimum number of messages involved
in the creation of each RPR (i.e. assumed to be equal to 2), ms is the GRF message
size (i.e. assumed to be 512 bytes), and hs is the GRF header size (i.e. currently 8
bytes).
M =
rn
mn
· (ms − hs) (6.1)
1Requests for creating new RPRs include all the requests with PID ∈ {1, 2, 4}. A comprehensive
list of PID values is available in Section 5.3.2.
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Figure 6.1: Memory consumption on GRRs based on the number and size of the
exchanged messages when each RPR is created by one request message.
Figure 6.1 shows the ratio of memory consumption to the number of exchanged
messages, assuming a best case scenario where each request leads to the creation of
one RPR entry. Here the memory size of each RPR is limited to the capacity of a
single GRF message. Nevertheless, it must be noted that 504 bytes of data is not
sufficient for building every type of RPR (e.g. Composite MPs). Bigger packet sizes
(ms) can significantly increase memory consumption.
According to Equation (6.1), the load imposed on the attacker based on the number
of messages she must exchange (rn) to occupy a certain amount of memory is:
rn =
M
ms − hs
·mn (6.2)
This is important as it represents the processing and network power that the attacker
must spend in order to consume a certain amount of memory on a remote node.
It must be noted that if multiple nodes attack a single GRR, as shown in Figure 6.2,
the amount of consumed memory multiplies by the number of attacker nodes.
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Figure 6.2: Memory consumption on GRRs based on the number of attackers, where
each RPR is created by one request message, and message size is 512 bytes.
6.3 Limited Acceptance Based on Source
In the current model, one malicious node can exhaust the resources of a large number
of other nodes by continuously sending requests for new RPR entries. As shown in
Figure 6.1, this requires that the attacker exchanges many messages with the nodes
under attack. Nevertheless, few resources are necessary in order to carry out this
attack because the nodes can be targeted sequentially and the attack can be carried
out ad infinitum.
One method to counter this problem is for GRRs to limit the acceptance of requests
for the creation of new RPR entries based on a threshold (T ) associated with the source
of the GRF messages. This prevents the malicious nodes from being able to exhaust
the resources of other nodes by sending the requests directly to the targeted nodes.
Hence, in order to occupy the same amount of memory on a remote node, the
attacker must go through an additional ((rn − mn)/T ) − 1 number of intermediary
nodes. In this scenario, the attacker must first attempt to create RPR entries on
the intermediary nodes, and then use those nodes to send the RPR requests to the
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Figure 6.3: Memory consumption on GRRs based on the number of attackers, where
each attacker is attacking with the highest capacity, and T = 500.
targeted node. This extra step increases the number of exchanged messages previously
shown in the Equation (6.2) to:
r′n = rn +
[(
rn −mn
T
− 1
)
× 2
]
(6.3)
This limitation affects the memory consumption for RPRs, previously shown in
Equation (6.1), as below, where i denotes the number of attackers targeting a single
router.
M′ = (ms − hs)
i∑
k=1
f(
rnk
mn
) (6.4)
f(x) =


x if x < T
T otherwise
The impact of this limitation is to significantly decrease the memory consumption
as shown in Figure 6.3, which must be compared with the consumption of the current
model which was shown in Figure 6.2. With this improvement, a large number of
attacker nodes must focus on a single GR router to exhaust its RAM.
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Figure 6.4: Router D allows only 10 RPRs per source T = 10, and M attacks D by
creating 20 RPRs via R1 and R2. Further legitimate requests by R1 and R2 will be
ignored by D.
Another approach by an attacker is to employ a large number of other routers to
send requests to the targeted node. This allows the attacker to perform a different
kind of DoS attack which is illustrated in Figure 6.4.
In this attack scenario, the malicious node M sends the requests through two
intermediary nodes R1 and R2 to the destination node D which is the target of the
attack. Router D accepts requests from R1 and R2 up to the threshold T = 10
and then ignores further requests from those two nodes. Consequently, at this stage
neither R1 nor R2 will be able to route their traffic through D. Furthermore, any
other non-malicious node, such as R3, will not be able to create routes on D through
R1 or R2.
6.4 Automatic Removal of Unused Paths
Limiting the acceptance of the requests for new RPRs based on their source forces
the attacker to use more nodes in the network to launch a DoS attack. However, this
is insufficient to fully eliminate the threat of DoS attacks on the circuit establishment
facility. Moreover, depending on the value assigned to the threshold T , the attacker
may still be able to waste a notable amount of RAM on GRF routers because she
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Table 6.2: Memory Consumption after Automatic Removal of Unused RPRs
Time (t) 1 2 3 4 5
Message (rnt) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
New RPRs 500 250 125 62 31
Total RPRs 500 750 825 887 918
Memory (KB) 246.09 369.14 406.05 436.57 451.82
incurs little processing and transmission costs to do so.
The situation can be improved by automatically removing unused RPR entries
from the GRF routers. To bypass this limit, the attacker is forced to not only create
new RPRs on the targeted routers, but also maintain the existing RPRs by regularly
transferring data through those nodes.
In order to understand the effect of this limitation, the requests sent by the attacker
need to be analysed according to the maximum amount that can be sent within a
certain period. We assume that the attacker can send approximately rnt number of
requests per a certain time interval t. For the duration of T intervals, the amount
of consumed memory can be calculated as shown in Equation (6.5). Here, the f(t)
denotes the number of messages necessary to maintain the dummy RPR entries during
the interval t.
M′ = (ms − hs)
T∑
t=1
rnt − f(t)
mn
(6.5)
f(x) =


0 if x ≤ 1
rn(x−1)
mn
+ f(x− 1) otherwise
For example, if the attacker can send 1000 new messages per each time interval
t, as shown in Table 6.2, a growing proportion of these messages must always be
dedicated to maintaining the existing RPRs and prevent their auto-removal.
This yields fewer new RPR entries that the attacker is able to create in each time
interval and thus limits the total amount of memory that can be consumed by the
attacker. Figure 6.5 shows the significant decrease in the memory usage even when
multiple attackers target one router.
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Figure 6.5: Memory consumption on GRRs based on the number of attackers, where
attackers can spend up to 1000 requests per time interval rnt = 1000, after automatic
removal of unused RPRs.
It must be noted that this technique forces the attacker to keep flooding
the targeted node with messages in order to maintain the dummy RPR entries.
Consequently, this approach limits the maximum number of nodes an attacker can
attack at any given time.
Figure 6.6 shows the difference between this technique and the original design,
where attackers keep sending 1000 messages per time interval and up to 5 intervals
(T = 5). As shown in the figure, the automatic removal of the unused RPR entries
causes the occupied memory to be released shortly after the attack stops.
This automatic removal of unused paths also addresses the DoS attack which was
shown in Figure 6.4 because creating indirect RPR entries do not help the attacker
to maintain the dummy entries on the attacked node. However, the shortcoming of
this approach is that the value of the time threshold T is very sensitive. That is,
a relatively strong attacker with sufficient resources can overflow a GRR before the
auto-removal algorithm can detect the unused RPR entries. In this case, the GRR
may completely fail and not be able to recover by eliminating the dummy RPRs.
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Figure 6.6: Memory consumption on GRRs when attackers send 1000 requests for 5
intervals, and then stop.
Choosing a very small T will not address the problem because then the RPRs may
expire and be removed even before the path is fully established or the actual data starts
flowing. Moreover, in order to reduce the delay caused by the circuit establishment,
the establisher may attempt to create multiple reserved paths to make them readily
available to use. This technique has been employed in the implementation of Tor
proxy [26]. A very small T value will also hamper such delay-avoiding techniques.
6.5 Caching Active Route Processing Rules
To counter the issues discussed in the previous section, the RPR entries must be
stored on Hard Disk Drive (HDD) as opposed to RAM. With this approach, even if
the attacker is able to overflow a router with a large number of requests prior to the
activation of auto-removal algorithm, the dummy RPR entries only waste some HDD
space. Since the amount of available HDD space is usually significantly greater than
RAM, this is a waste that all routers can easily bear.
Storing RPRs on HDD naturally introduces extra lag when the routers are
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Table 6.3: Usage of RAM after Caching
Time (t) 1 2 3 4 5
Message (rnt) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
New RPRs 500 250 125 62 31
Total RPRs 500 750 825 887 918
HDD (KB) 246.09 369.14 406.05 436.57 451.82
RAM (KB) 0 0 246.09 369.14 406.05
matching the incoming messages against the RPRs. To address this issue, routers
need to cache the frequently used RPRs; that is, those which receive more traffic
more often. The caching technique reduces the time required to access these active
entries while the dummy RPRs created by the attackers will remain in HDD and be
automatically removed.
In order to prevent the dummy RPRs from auto-removal, the attacker must keep
sending rd number of dummy messages, for each individual entry, for the duration of
Tc intervals, before the router loads them into RAM (i.e. caches them). The amount
of occupied RAM can be calculated according to the following equation that differs
from Equation (6.5) in the definition of f(x).
M′ = (ms − hs)
T∑
t=1
rnt − f(t)
mn
(6.6)
f(x) =


0 if x ≤ Tc(
rn(x−1)
mn
· rd
)
+ f(x− 1) otherwise
Table 6.3 shows the impact of this technique on the consumption of HDD and
RAM, where the GRR expects to receive one data message per interval for each
existing RPR (rd = 1) for at least two consecutive intervals (Tc = 2). With an
increase in the number of expected messages per interval, i.e. rd > 1, more of an
attacker’s messages must be devoted to renewing the dummy RPRs; and thus the
attacker will have less chance to create new RPRs.
This technique is also resistant to Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks,
whereby multiple attackers simultaneously target one router. As shown in Figure 6.7,
irrespective of the amount of resources at the attacker’s disposal, or the number of
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Figure 6.7: RAM consumption on GRRs based on the number of attackers, where
attackers can spend up to 1000 requests per time interval rnt = 1000, after caching
only the active RPRs.
simultaneous attacks, there is actually zero memory consumption for the period of Tc
intervals. This provides the time required for the automatic removal algorithm to be
able to identify and remove the dummy RPRs.
Note that the caching technique does not enforce automatic removal of the RPRs
and thus the occupied memory will not be freed if the attack is stopped. This is unlike
the effect of the auto-removal technique which was shown in Figure 6.6.
6.6 Summary of the Chapter
In order to answer Research Question 4 of this thesis, this chapter has analysed the
circuit establishment facility of the anonymous communication framework which we
proposed in the Chapter 5. The analysis aimed to identify the weaknesses of that
facility against DoS and DDoS attacks.
We identified a number of weaknesses that an attacker is able to exploit in order
to disrupt the circuit establishment facility of GRF. In this chapter we proposed three
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techniques to address these weaknesses, and evaluated the impact of each technique
on the consumption of the resources of framework routers while under attack.
The first technique aims to limit the number of acceptable requests for new RPRs
based on the source of the messages. Consequently, a limit is enforced on the ability
of the attacker to directly exploit the targeted router. Secondly, we proposed that the
routers automatically remove unused RPRs, which forces the attacker to keep sending
an additional and large number of messages to maintain the previously-created RPRs.
The third technique is to store the RPRs in HDD as opposed to RAM and employs
caching to cure the resultant delay.
Employing a combination of these techniques enables a GRR to resist the DoS and
DDoS attack aimed to destabilise the circuit establishment facility of GRF. The generic
anonymous communication framework proposed in this thesis is the first attempt to
build such a system and therefore requires further research and development to become
a fully-fledged platform. In this chapter we aimed at improving the reliability of the
circuit establishment facility. Analyses of the weaknesses of GRF towards similar and
other attacks are venues for future work.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
Information is power.
Anonymous communication is one of the fundamental requirements in systems
that must protect the privacy of users, and has a wide range of applications such as
electronic voting schemes, anonymous storage and retrieval systems and anonymous
remailers. Systems that provide anonymous communications, known as Anonymous
Communication Systems (ACSs), constitute an important part of Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PETs) and are widely used to protect against surveillance, to circumvent
Internet censorship, to gain and retain freedom of speech, or to otherwise protect the
privacy of users against arbitrary interference.
In the absence of dedicated ACSs, the existence of metadata along with leaks from
the communication layer can disclose a great deal of private information about Internet
users. Mix-based ACSs, otherwise known as mix systems or mixnets, are an important
family of systems that provide protection against such unintended disclosures. In
this thesis we have paid particular attention to mix systems and took a step towards
making them more secure and efficient.
Firstly, we revisited one of the most important mix designs; namely, Binomial
Mix. We examined the security of that mix against a passive attacker. To that
end, we developed a simulator using Java, which we then used to simulate the
probabilistic passive attack known to be effective against Binomial Mix. Our study
focused particularly on the behaviour of the mix under various traffic conditions
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relative to the capacity of the mix. We defined multiple scenarios with the ratio
of the incoming traffic ranging from 10% to 90% of the capacity and measured the
attacker’s success rate in every traffic condition. Analysing the results showed that
the previously reported probabilistic passive attack is significantly less effective than
is believed. Observation of the results also led to the discovery that additional, but so
far neglected, information is available to the adversary that can be used to improve
the reported attack. We presented the rates of success that the attacker can achieve
under various traffic conditions, and reported the distribution of false-positive results
which may be used to build a more efficient attack.
Secondly, we attempted to improve the design of Binomial Mix in terms of
security and efficiency, and proposed two new mix designs. These mixes run multiple
selection algorithms, each of which chooses messages from the pool according to a
Binomial distribution. An independent bias function operates in association with
each selection algorithm. Therefore, the behaviour of the mixes is not closely linked
to the known behaviour of any single mathematical function. The first design,
Multi-Binomial Shared-Pool Mix (MBSP Mix) executes one selection algorithm
at a time and has a single pool of messages shared amongst all coexisting
selection algorithms. The second proposal, Multi-Binomial Independent-Pool Mix
(MBIP Mix), executes multiple selection algorithms simultaneously, and contains
a separate pool of messages associated to each selection algorithm. We measured
the efforts of both active and passive attackers on MBSP Mix and MBIP Mix and
compared the results with that of the attackers on Binomial Mix. Both mixes show a
significantly more secure build against both active and passive attacks. It is also shown
that these designs are robust even against blending attacks which are notoriously
difficult to foil. We further evaluated these designs by comparing delays imposed
on the communication channel and showed that, depending on the combination and
properties of coexisting selection algorithms, both mixes can achieve significantly less
delay than that resulting from the operation of Binomial Mix. We examined a variety
of different coexisting selection algorithms and reported their delays in various traffic
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conditions.
We then turned our attention to the operation of mix systems as a whole,
and proposed a framework for building mix-based ACSs. The framework, referred
to as Garbled Routing Framework (GRF), provides various facilities required by
mix systems to build arbitrary circuits in the network, to route traffic, and to perform
arbitrary processing of the messages in transit. Each ACS can use the facilities of
GRF by meeting certain architectural requirements and can then join the platform
as a collection of plug-in components. In order to showcase the generic nature of
the design of GRF, we modelled the operation of two well-known ACSs which serve
different purposes; namely, Tor and Mixmaster. We also analysed and discussed the
security aspects of GRF such as its susceptibility to distribution of malicious code in
the system and the likelihood of success of various attacks after a specific mix system
adopts the design of GRF. Additionally, we proved the feasibility of the design by
developing a Java-based implementation, and conducted tests for establishing various
types of circuits and transferring data through the system.
Lastly, we attended to one of the important security challenges of GRF, that
is, the Denial-of-Service (DoS) and the distributed counterpart, the Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. We considered how the circuit establishment facility
of GRF can be made resistant towards the DoS attacks. Noting that malicious network
nodes are able to launch both DoS and DDoS attacks on GRF and put the targeted
routers under undue load and pressure, we first identified the weaknesses of GRF which
would allow such attacks. We then proposed certain techniques that, if implemented
by the routers of GRF, will fully equip them against the identified DoS and DDoS
attacks. We evaluated the impacts of the proposed techniques through mathematical
modelling of the attack situation before and after employing the proposed techniques.
Limitations and Future Directions
Where we evaluated the design of Binomial Mix, we used the definition of
probabilistic passive attack previously reported in the literature. Our work led to
the discovery of additional information that the attacker may use to improve the
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attack; namely, the predictable distribution of false-positive results.
As an interesting future work, one could consider building models to utilise
this additional knowledge in order to improve the effectiveness and accuracy of the
passive attack. Such an improvement is likely to require fewer rounds of observations,
which translates into less effort required by a passive attacker to compromise the
anonymity provided by Binomial Mix.
As our experiments with Binomial Mix showed, the attacks known to be
effective on mixes may have very different rates of success depending on traffic
conditions. Therefore, it is important to examine the impact of traffic volume on
other selection algorithms of Binomial Mix (e.g. not based on normal CDF), other
mix designs, and against attacks of a different nature (e.g. active attacks).
On a related topic, we proposed the design of MBIP Mix, which allows
mixing high- and low-latency traffic by hosting coexisting selection algorithms with
corresponding properties. We have provided multiple examples of such coexistence.
As another interesting future work, one may consider finding an optimal combination
of selection algorithms and their corresponding properties to coexist within an
MBIP Mix. An optimal design would offer a high degree of anonymity as well as a
low latency. In the context of MBSP Mix, the same question can be asked in relation
to communications with only one kind of latency.
Finally, we note that building a fully-fledged framework for generic anonymous
communication is a major undertaking and involves consideration of various and many
reliability, scalability and security aspects. Our work is a step towards creating such a
system. The possibilities for future work in this domain are numerous. For example,
one could analyse other facilities of our proposed framework (e.g. routing, design of
routers and services of the network authority) and study their resilience against a
variety of attacks common to ACSs. It is also necessary to build components for the
existing mix systems (e.g. Tor and I2P) enabling them to migrate to the framework.
Another aspect of our proposed framework is that it allows secret
message-processing techniques to operate alongside the publicly-known solutions. At
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this stage, we considered this feature to be experimental and only note its potential
benefits; namely, the uncertainty it adds to the behaviour of the routers, which further
impedes traffic analyses. More analyses and research work are required to understand
and evaluate the impact of this feature so as to inform its further development.
We hope that our results stimulate further research in this domain and guide future
endeavours.
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Glossary
active attack is an attack on the system where the attacker attempts to
alter system resources or affect their operation.
active attacker is an attacker that carries out an active attack.
anonymity set is the usual suspects, that is, the set of subjects with
potentially the same attributes who might cause an action.
The anonymity set is relative with respect to the attacker
and may vary over time.
batching strategy is the algorithm in a mix which specifies how to store,
mix and forward messages; and may consist of multiple
selection algorithms.
bias function is a mathematical function used as part of the
selection algorithm of a mix to determine the bias of the
probability distribution that is used to randomly select a
subset of messages in the pool.
bitwise unlinkability is the property of two encoded network messages where
an observer is unable to link them by finding a meaningful
relation between their bit patterns.
Chaumian mix refers to the first design of mix that was proposed in 1981
by Chaum [8].
external attack is an attack on the system where the attacker only controls
communication links.
flushing time is the moment a mix flushes a number of messages it
contains according to its batching strategy.
global anonymity is the degree of anonymity enjoyed by all of the users of
an ACS.
global attacker is an attacker that can observe all of network links
including the edges of the network.
guest ACS is an ACS hosted and operates within GRF.
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individual anonymity is the degree of anonymity enjoyed by an individual
subject.
internal attack is an attack on the system where the attacker controls one
or several entities that are part of the system (e.g. some
communication nodes or some elements inside a mix).
local attacker is an attacker that can observe only a subset but not all
of network links.
metadata is what remains of a communication or document after its
contents and substance is excluded (e.g. IP addresses,
time of communication, volume of the communicated
material).
mix is a network router that mixes, and might alter, a number
of incoming messages before relaying them, thereby
offering anonymity by obfuscating the link between the
incoming and outgoing messages.
mix system is an ACS that leverages the concept of mix to achieve
anonymous communication, and may consist of one or
more mixes.
mixnet is a network of interconnected mixes.
passive attack is an attack on the system where the attacker attempts
to learn or make use of information from the system but
does not affect system resources.
passive attacker is an attacker that carries out a passive attack.
reusability refers to the use of existing assets (e.g. source
code, software components, test suites, designs and
documentation) within the software product development
process.
selection algorithm is an algorithm in a mix that specifies which subset of the
incoming messages should be flushed.
threat model is the description of the security issues considered in the
context of this thesis.
traffic mixer is the same as a mix.
